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DIVIDED AND CONQUERED: THE NEOLIBERAL ROOTS 




The “arbitration revolution” has diminished access to justice for 
millions of people, allowing American corporations to secure significant 
insulation from collective challenges in both judicial and arbitral forums. 
Although currently identified damages are immense, some scholars have 
recently described proposals to undo the revolution as wishful thinking 
in the current political climate. This Article acknowledges the political 
difficulty but seeks to uncover the roots of the problem to re-open a path 
for a change. 
Offering an analysis of the 2019 United States Supreme Court 
decision in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, this Article demonstrates that the 
“revolution” has been driven not by the oft-declared policy of “favoring 
arbitration,” but by a premeditated effort to undermine collectivity. This 
legal hostility towards collective actions, this Article shows, has been 
part of a broader transformation: the rise to dominance of neoliberalism 
and the resulting creation of a corporatized political economy. It thus 
reconceptualizes the arbitration revolution as a process of separating 
collective actors, one that has been inspired by neoliberal theorists, 
executed and funded by organized corporate interests, and embraced by 
the Supreme Court.  
This new framing highlights previously unrecognized harm of the 
arbitration revolution: it leaves prospective claimants feeling isolated 
from their peers and abandoned by their state, inducing pervasive 
feelings of powerlessness. Having identified this affective outcome, this 
Article shows how the emotional consequences of the revolution further 
operate to suppress resistance and invoke resignation. These behavioral 
tendencies are not unintended consequences; instead, they are produced 
by a calculated effort to foster neoliberal hegemony and corporate control 
by cultivating the passivity of ordinary citizens. 
This Article ends with a warning that those who feel powerless and 
resigned about the protection of their legal rights may feel similarly 
indisposed to engage in other forms of democratic citizenship. By 
offering a novel understanding of how the arbitration revolution vitiates 
 
 * Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. For invaluable feedback I thank Kathryn 
Abrams, Kelsey Finn, Danielle Hart, Martha Fineman, Gowri Ramachandran, Rachel 
VanLandingham, and participants in presentations at the Annual International Conference on 
Contracts, the Annual Law and Society Meeting, and the Vulnerability Initiative. Special thanks 
to the editors of the Florida Law Review.   
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collectivity and threatens democracy, this Article aims to reignite efforts 
to undo the revolution and reauthorize citizens to act collectively. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The following is a true story that in April 2019 ended up in an 
important Supreme Court decision.1  
Early in 2016, while working as a warehouseman in Redlands, 
California, Frank Varela discovered that his most personal information, 
including his social security number, his tax identification number, and 
his bank account number, was compromised by his employer.2 A letter 
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) confirmed that the sensitive data 
was used to file a fraudulent tax return under Frank’s name.3 Frank had 
to submit to the IRS an identity theft affidavit, and he and his wife, 
 
 1. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).  
 2. Class Action Complaint at 4–5, Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. CV 16-577-DMG 
(KSx), 2016 WL 9110161 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016), rev’d, 771 F. App’x 418 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 3. Id.  
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss3/3
2020] THE NEOLIBERAL ROOTS AND EMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES 577 
 
 
Darlene, were notified by the IRS that the scam would prevent them from 
using electronic filing for the foreseeable future.4 Distressed and afraid 
of additional abuses, the couple also had to start paying monthly fees for 
a lifetime monitoring of their accounts.5  
Frank was not the only one to suffer.6 His employer of about nine 
years, Lamps Plus, Inc.—“the nation’s largest lighting retailer”—
publicly announced that all those who had worked for Lamps Plus during 
the 2015 calendar year were impacted.7 The company later explained that 
a severe data breach occurred when it “fell victim to a sophisticated 
criminal phishing attack” in which “[t]he hackers impersonated a high-
level Lamps Plus employee by sending a fake email to an actual Lamps 
Plus employee and requested all of Lamps Plus’s 2015 W-2 employee tax 
forms.”8 In response, “[t]he actual Lamps Plus employee . . . sent the W-
2s to the hackers.”9 At least 1,300 employees were harmed.10 As 
compensation, Lamps Plus offered them one year of free identity 
monitoring services.11 
Frustrated by his employer’s continuous mishandling of the entire 
scandal—from the initial neglect that enabled the harm, through the 
failure to notify its victims, to the refusal to offer fair compensation—
Frank sued.12 On behalf of himself and the other affected employees, he 
filed a class action complaint in a California federal district court and 
sought relief.13 Lamps Plus, however, asked the trial court to compel 
Frank to arbitrate the dispute and dismiss the lawsuit.14 The district court 
found no way around the fact that, as a condition to being hired by Lamps 
Plus, Frank had had to sign an arbitration agreement in 2007.15 For that 
reason, the court decided to compel arbitration and accordingly dismissed 
the case.16 However, the court allowed Frank to arbitrate all his claims, 
including the class-wide claims he had made on behalf of all harmed 
employees.17 Then, despite its success in compelling arbitration, Lamps 
 
 4. Id. at 5.  
 5. Id. at 6. 
 6. Id. at 3. 
 7. Id. at 3–4.  
 8. Motion to Compel Arbitration on an Individual Basis &, in the Alternative, a Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss at 1, Lamps Plus, No. CV 16-577-DMG (KSx), 2016 WL 9110161. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Class Action Complaint, supra note 2, at 3. 
 11. Id. at 4.  
 12. Id. at 3.  
 13. Id.  
 14. See Motion to Compel Arbitration on an Individual Basis &, in the Alternative, A Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 2.   
 15. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. CV 16-577-DMG (KSx), 2016 WL 9110161, at *1, *4 
(C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016), rev’d, 771 F. App’x 418 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 16. Id. at *7. 
 17. Id. 
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Plus appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, seeking 
to prevent him from pursuing class arbitration and compel him to arbitrate 
all by himself.18 The Ninth Circuit refused to order so,19 and Lamps Plus 
continued its battle against class arbitration at the Supreme Court. In 
April 2019, in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (Lamps Plus),20 the Supreme 
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, denying Frank the ability to 
band together with his coworkers to hold their employer accountable for 
the data breach that will continue to haunt them for many years.21  
Lamps Plus is the Supreme Court’s latest opinion in a series of 
decisions that, in the last few decades, and with particular intensity since 
2010, continuously and considerably extended the reach of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).22 While the first cases in this series might have 
appeared to reflect merely a procedural development, the ongoing 
expansion of the FAA has later created a growing awareness that the 
process has had an immense impact on matters of substantive law and 
issues of socio-economic justice. 
In response, scholars, journalists, and policymakers have made a 
significant effort to document and analyze the increasing expansion of 
the FAA. They frequently criticize the Court for extending the FAA far 
beyond what its history and language could justify, and particularly for 
allowing powerful corporations to include pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses in their standard contracts and to use them against 
considerably weaker parties.23 By 2015, even before the process reached 
its current peak, a federal judge described the constant expansion of the 
FAA as one of the “most profound shifts in our legal history.”24 In a 
similar tone, some scholars have referred to it as “the arbitration 
revolution,”25 a designation that will be used here as well. 
 
 18. See Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 
1407. 
 19. Id. at 673.  
 20. 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
 21. Id. at 1419.  
 22. Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1−16 (2012)). 
 23. See, e.g., David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 67, 75 (2015). 
 24. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the 
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015) (citing Federal Judge William G. Young), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-
deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/U848-RDP7].  
 25. E.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 408–09 (discussing the effects of “the arbitration revolution”); see 
Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 23, at 70–76 (2015) (explaining the development of “the 
consumer arbitration revolution”); see also J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion 
of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3057 (2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s recent 
arbitration jurisprudence as its “arbitration revolution”). 
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The arbitration revolution is far-reaching. The Supreme Court has 
ruled that the FAA’s relentless protection of arbitration clauses applies in 
a broad range of settings and therefore covers millions of people in a 
multitude of situations.26 As legal scholar Judith Resnik described it in 
2015, the FAA applies, for example,  
when individuals claim breaches of federal securities laws; 
when employees allege discrimination on the basis of age; 
when employees file sex discrimination suits under state 
law; when consumers assert rights under state consumer 
protection laws; when merchants allege violations of the 
antitrust laws; and when family members claim that 
negligent management of nursing homes resulted in the 
wrongful deaths of their relatives.27  
Assuming you own a smartphone, have a bank account, and use a credit 
card, the revolution applies to you and anyone you know. 
As will be shown below, although the revolution is tied to arbitration 
clauses inserted into standard contracts, it has less to do with arbitrating 
disputes and much more to do with thwarting legal challenges altogether. 
The revolution is an intentional and organized effort to prevent 
individuals like Frank Varela from coping with corporate wrongdoing by 
appealing to the powers of solidarity and collective action. What 
appeared at first as merely an effort to avoid litigation in courts through 
the imposition of mandatory arbitration has become a leading strategy of 
corporations, later approved by the Court, to wield arbitration clauses as 
weapons against any collective proceedings. Therefore, these clauses 
impede collective acts regardless of forum, both in courts (class actions) 
and in arbitration (class arbitrations). As the dissent in Lamps Plus 
recently summed it up: “[T]he Court has hobbled the capacity of 
employees and consumers to band together in a judicial or arbitral 
forum.”28  
The assault on all forms of collective actions—including when it 
means denying claimants their “effective access to justice”29—is the most 
disturbing part of the arbitration revolution. Such denial is particularly 
alarming when, as the dissent in Lamps Plus emphasized, the dispute 
“cries out for collective treatment” because it concerns corporate 
 
 26. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2839 (2015). 
 27. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 28. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1421 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added).  
 29. Id. at 1422 (quoting DirecTV, Inc. v. Inburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting)).  
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misconduct that identically and severely harmed numerous people.30 
Without the ability to act together, victims of such misconduct cannot 
seek redress due to their limited means and the prohibitive cost of legal 
proceedings. Moreover, if no victim can effectively seek redress, 
corporations gain immunity and have no incentive to avoid future 
misconduct. Allowing this anti-collective mechanism to work in the first 
place, and then gradually removing any remaining ability of lower courts 
to limit it, is what makes the Court’s radical expansion of the FAA truly 
“revolutionary.” This Article thus further studies unexplored dimensions 
of this assault on collectivity.  
Critics of the arbitration revolution have already described many of 
its negative consequences. Currently identified harms include decreased 
access to justice, hindered development of substantive laws, under-
enforcement of central federal laws that rely on private civil litigation, 
and, due to the accumulation of all of the previous concerns, a severe 
threat to equality and the rule of law.31 Additionally, a new wave of 
studies has emerged, responding to the arbitration revolution in a 
different way. These works seem to accept the revolution as a fait 
accompli and thus refrain from seeking to roll it back. Instead, they focus 
on describing and analyzing post-revolution realities, mostly drawing on 
empirical tools.32 Pessimistically, some of these works have recently 
described proposals to undo the revolution as wishful thinking in “the 
current political climate.”33 But, even in the face of such a climate, it may 
be too early to lose all hope for a change. This Article seeks to forge a 
new path to reform by highlighting that the rich literature to date has paid 
little to no attention to several key questions related to the anti-collective 
heart of the arbitration revolution: What political powers facilitated the 
legal foreclosure of all paths to collective actions?34 What are the long-
 
 30. Id. at 1421. 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 23, at 70–76; see also Victor D. Quintanilla 
& Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute Binding Arbitration Clauses Are Unjust: 
Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in the Time of Vanishing Trials, 85 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2119, 2121–22 (2017) (describing “[r]ecent empirical legal studies that explore predispute 
binding arbitration”); Elizabeth C. Tippett & Bridget Schaaff, How Concepcion and Italian Colors 
Affected Terms of Service Contracts in the Gig Economy, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 459, 464–75 
(2018). 
 33. Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four 
Providers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 62 n.283 (2019) (stating that “federal intervention is wishful 
thinking given the . . . current political climate”). 
 34. This question has received “little” attention while the following two received none.  
More works have discussed relating to the first question. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE 
DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 153 (2015) (“Together, these decisions assault 
every level of organized popular power and collective consciousness in the United States: citizens, 
consumers, workers.”); see also Gilles, supra note 25, at 409–14 (“[L]aw cannot grow in the 
darkness with which arbitration shrouds its activities . . . .”).  
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss3/3
2020] THE NEOLIBERAL ROOTS AND EMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES 581 
 
 
term emotional and social consequences of such a dramatic shift? Finally, 
which future reality may develop from these newly recognized 
consequences?  
This Article delves into these questions. The nuanced answers it 
provides create new grounds for evaluating the arbitration revolution and 
for resuming efforts to overturn it. Adding a multidisciplinary account of 
the attack on collectivity to the current literature, this Article 
reconceptualizes the meaning of the revolution and the magnitude of its 
consequences while making three different claims. 
The first is that the revolution has not been driven by the often-
declared “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”35 but by a 
premeditated anti-collective approach instead. To substantiate this claim, 
this Article analyzes the latest decision in Lamps Plus as offering 
compelling new evidence that the revolution has been motivated by a 
deep aversion to collectivity and has substantially contributed to a process 
aimed at isolating people. Before Lamps Plus, many had seen the 
revolution as anchored in the Court’s uncompromising command to 
enforce class-action waivers.36 However, the analysis of Lamps Plus 
offered here reveals that such waivers are effectively no longer necessary. 
For the first time in the history of federal arbitration law, the Court has 
clarified that even an arbitration clause without a waiver would suffice to 
block collective actions.37 In other words, Lamps Plus has turned 
mandatory isolation into the new default rule. Therefore, silence itself 
becomes a waiver of the right to come together. And, since it is unrealistic 
to think that corporations will draft their standard arbitration clauses in a 
manner that expresses their affirmative consent to collective proceedings, 
such a default rule essentially turns into a general ban on collective 
proceedings.   
This Article’s next claim is that the arbitration revolution is not 
merely, and perhaps not even primarily, a legal shift. Rather, the anti-
collective approach and the isolation it imposes are essential features of 
a greater transformative change: the rise to dominance of neoliberalism 
and the resulting creation of a corporatized political economy. To 
establish this claim, this Article first defines neoliberalism. It then traces 
the interactions between the people, theories, and institutions that have 
long been at the frontier of disseminating neoliberal logic, on the one 
hand, and the revolution’s leading Supreme Court Justices and the 
neoliberal legal discourse that they have advanced, on the other.  
Recognizing what links, for example, a Nobel Laureate (James 
Buchanan), an influential billionaire (Charles Koch), and a dominant 
 
 35. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).   
 36. See, e.g., Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 23, at 65. 
 37. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019).   
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Justice (Antonin Scalia) makes it possible to reconceptualize the 
arbitration revolution as both a product of neoliberal rationality and a tool 
for further establishing neoliberal hegemony. As such, the revolution 
belongs with a growing list of legal shifts that follow the same trajectory, 
allowing corporations not only to immunize themselves through contracts 
but also to dominate campaign finance,38 hold First Amendment rights,39 
break up unions,40 and so much more. 
The third claim is that the arbitration revolution causes severe harm 
that until now has not been identified: the inducement of long-lasting 
feelings of powerlessness. This damage surfaces once one recognizes that 
the arbitration revolution is part of an effective campaign designed to 
separate people in order to make it harder for them to battle unlimited 
corporate power. Drawing on a variety of reported qualitative interviews, 
consumers’ websites, and studies of emotions, this Article uncovers how 
the isolation created by the revolution extends its harsh practical effects 
to the domain of emotions. It also describes the resulting perilous cluster 
of emotions under, labels it “affective powerlessness,” and explains how 
it works to leave people resigned and unable to resist. Critically, this 
Article establishes that the resignation generated by affective 
powerlessness is not an unintended consequence. Instead, it is part of 
what anthropologists have called “the politics of resignation”—a 
calculated effort to protect neoliberal hegemony and corporate control by 
cultivating submissiveness. 
When combined, the above three claims tell an unusual story, laying 
the foundation for a new understanding of the arbitration revolution and 
its sweeping results. It is a story of a separation process inspired by 
neoliberal theorists, executed and funded by organized corporate 
interests, and embraced by the Supreme Court. This separation process 
leaves people isolated from their peers and abandoned by the state, 
resulting in intense feelings of powerlessness. Unsurprisingly, as this 
Article further explains, this emotional state operates to suppress 
resistance and invoke resignation, both of which happen to serve the 
neoliberal goal of full dominance perfectly. The most significant risk that 
the revolution presents, therefore, does not arise merely from the fact that 
corporations found a way—legitimized by the Supreme Court—to avoid 
legal liability. The threat extends to the production of collective 
numbness and dangerous apathy, which the law allows and perpetuates. 
 
 38. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010). 
 39. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 740 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[The] RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs 
no matter the impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the 
corporation owners’ religious faith . . . .”). 
 40. See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018) (invalidating a statute that required 
all employees, including nonmembers, to pay a membership fee). 
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This Article tells this meaningful story in three Parts. The first Part 
reanalyzes the leading cases of the arbitration revolution in light of the 
latest decision in Lamps Plus, demonstrating that the revolution has 
worked to suppress collective actions and has embraced corporations’ 
efforts to avoid liability by separating masses of claimants. The second 
Part places the separating effect of the arbitration revolution within a web 
of neoliberal powers, explaining how the legal shift has both reflected the 
rise of neoliberalism and actively enhanced its dominance. The third Part 
builds on the previous two to expose a troubling and unrecognized effect 
of the separation process: the generation of affective powerlessness. It 
further illuminates how feelings of powerlessness tend to repress 
resistance and foster resignation. 
This Article concludes with a warning that adds urgency to its call for 
undoing the separating power of the arbitration revolution. The isolation 
and resignation intentionally engendered by neoliberals and the 
corporations they promote are unlikely to remain contained within the 
boundaries of standard contracts. People who feel resigned regarding 
their legal rights are prone to feel similarly indisposed to engage in other 
forms of democratic citizenship. This Article thus offers a better 
understanding of how the arbitration revolution threatens democracy. 
Such recognition should reignite efforts to give people back their freedom 
to act collectively and, with it, the drive to contribute to our democratic 
society.   
I.  SUPPRESSING COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
More than resulting from a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration,”41 the arbitration revolution has been driven by a 
premeditated anti-collective approach. This Part provides compelling 
new evidence that the revolution has been motivated by a deep aversion 
to collectivity, clearly aiming at isolating people. Until recently, many 
had seen the revolution as anchored in the Court’s uncompromising 
command to enforce class-action waivers.42 However, the analysis of 
latest case of the revolution, Lamps Plus, against the background of its 
predecessors, reveals that such waivers are effectively no longer 
necessary. For the first time in the history of federal arbitration law, the 
Court has clarified that even a “silent” arbitration clause, one without a 
waiver, would suffice to block collective actions.43 In other words, Lamps 
Plus has turned isolation into the new default rule. Therefore, silence 
itself becomes a waiver of the right to come together. And, since it is 
 
 41. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).   
 42. See, e.g., Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 23, at 65. 
 43. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019).   
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unrealistic to think that corporations will draft their standard arbitration 
clauses in a manner that expressly permits collective proceedings, such a 
default rule essentially means that any arbitration clause forbids class 
action, even if it does not say so. What comes next explains how we got 
to this point. 
A.  Arbitration Clauses as Hideouts 
The use of contractual arbitration clauses to prevent collective actions 
of small parties (individuals and small businesses) against their massive 
counterparts (large-scale corporations) is a relatively new phenomenon. 
For many years the practice of arbitration and the jurisprudence that 
surrounded it did not relate to collective actions at all.44 As many have 
repeatedly noted, the principal legislation pertaining to arbitration, the 
FAA, was enacted in 1925 “to enable merchants of roughly equal 
bargaining power to enter into binding agreements to arbitrate com-
mercial disputes.”45 In 1925, and for many decades after the enactment 
of the FAA, predispute arbitration agreements were in limited use, and to 
the extent they existed, they did not attempt to prevent collective 
actions.46  
Put differently, while legal “friendliness” towards the practice of 
arbitration dates back to the 1925 FAA, judicial hostility towards 
collective actions—either in courts or in arbitration—is a more recent 
shift. And it is a dramatic shift that has been facilitated by a combination 
of technological, economic, political, and legal conditions. Importantly, 
this shift has very little to do with arbitration as a method of settling 
disputes outside of courts.47 Instead, the shift represents an immense 
effort to avoid dispute resolution altogether. For that reason, describing 
the process as the arbitration revolution, or referring to the Court’s recent 
“arbitration jurisprudence,”48 tends to obscure the true nature of the 
transformation. What is truly at stake is a legally facilitated practice that 
is calculatedly designed to insulate corporations from legal liability by 
preventing claimants from coming together—which is by and large their 
only viable path to redress. 
Given the intention to avoid liability by breaking up groups of 
similarly harmed people, perhaps a more adequate name for the process 
would have been “the isolation revolution” or “the separation revolution.” 
 
 44. See Gilles, supra note 25, at 390. 
 45. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1643 (2018). 
 46. Gilles, supra note 25, at 375, 376 (describing how, until the last two decades, use of 
arbitration clauses to block class actions was unimaginable).   
 47. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of 
the Modern Class Actions, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396 (2005).   
 48. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 25, at 3054 (emphasis added) (repeatedly referring to the 
Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence).  
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Nonetheless, because the analysis that follows generally aims at 
reconceptualizing the meaning of the arbitration revolution, it continues 
to use this phrase to address the legal change while demonstrating that, 
in reality, it establishes an intentional separation process with harsh 
consequences. 
The argument on this point is more than rhetorical. First, and most 
significantly, including separating terms within arbitration clauses or 
arbitration agreements artificially places these terms under the coverage 
of the FAA. Such placement awards separating terms disproportionate 
protection that initially only meant to promote conducting arbitrations 
and not preventing them. Second, because arbitration generally enjoys a 
positive reputation—much thanks to powerful messages from the 
Supreme Court49—the method of folding isolating terms into arbitration 
agreements operates to conceal the negative impact of these anti-
collective terms. Consequently, because the anti-collective terms are 
hidden within arbitration agreements, noticing and resisting their 
separating effect turns harder. The following section will describe how 
the contractual use of arbitration clauses turned into an effort to suppress 
collective action and how the Supreme Court’s constant support of such 
manipulation has not only propelled its use but also enhanced its effect. 
As we shall see, achieving isolation through arbitration has been a 
product of a reciprocal exchange between corporations and an activist 
pro-corporate judiciary.  
B.  Separation via Enforcement of Collective Action Waivers 
Arbitration clauses did not always dictate isolation. The change has 
started during the 1990s and was driven by a growing desire of 
corporations to limit or even avoid their exposure to class actions.50 Many 
corporations that at earlier times did not seem interested in any form of 
alternative dispute resolution, or even opposed it,51 have begun to 
reconsider their approach. Of particular significance at this time was the 
technological progress that had increased the use of paper standard-form 
contracts and would later speed up even more with the ability to use 
online mass-contracting. This progress allowed corporations to dictate 
the content of their contracts with greater ease and an immensely 
enhanced impact. Encouraged by professional publications that 
recommended a pro-active solution to the “problem” of class actions, 
 
 49. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
(“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy 
favoring arbitration.”).   
 50. Gilles, supra note 47, at 396.  
 51. See SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 55 (2015) (describing how in the past corporations resisted arbitration, 
especially in the employment domain). 
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corporations and their lawyers have launched the attack on collective 
actions: drafting and including in all their contracts what today seems to 
be an integral part of almost any standard-form contract: collective action 
waivers.52 As their name suggests, these waivers’ goal is to make 
individuals and small businesses give up their ability to respond to 
corporate wrongdoing by joining forces with similarly harmed others.53 
Aware of the general favoring of arbitrations, experts suggested to 
place the new collective action waivers not just anywhere in the contract 
but deliberately insert them into arbitration clauses.54 At the time, pre-
dispute arbitration clauses offered “safe harbors” for the new waivers 
since courts had already shown an increased inclination to treat 
arbitration clauses favorably, even when they were tucked in the 
boilerplate of standard form contracts.55 In an article tellingly titled “The 
Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield,” for example, the author wrote 
that “[while a]n arbitration clause may not be an invincible shield against 
class action litigation . . . it is surely one of the strongest pieces of armor 
available . . . .”56  
The creative proposal to separate potential joint claimants via standard 
contracts that include arbitration clauses in their boilerplate had an 
impact. By the late 1990s, a growing number of corporations had adopted 
collective action waivers as part of their newly implemented or formerly 
existing arbitration clauses.57 And yet, about a decade later, in 2005, 
Professor Myriam Gilles reported that “[t]he penetration of 
collective action waivers is relatively miniscule today,” importantly 
attributing the slowness of the process to the then-existing uncertainty 
regarding the legal validity of mass-use of collective action waivers.58 
Indeed, as Professor Gilles predicted,59 the speedy spread of the new anti-
collective strategy was awaiting an endorsement from the legal system. 
Some of the hesitations of corporations and their lawyers were 
generated by the then-unanswered question: What if a court will strike 
 
 52. Gilles, supra note 47, at 396–98. This Article follows Professor Gilles’s choice to use 
the term “collective action waivers” to capture a variety of possible aggregate proceedings 
available either in courts or in arbitration. Id. at 376 n.15.   
 53. See id. at 396.  
 54. See id. at 396–97.   
 55. See id. at 393–94.   
 56. Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE 
L. J. 141, 142 (1997). 
 57. Gilles, supra note 47, at 397–98. 
 58. Id. at 425; see id. at 426 (suggesting that the lack of appellate opinions regarding 
collective action waivers might cause “reluctance on the part of general counsel to rush into a 
perceived violation of applicable law”).  
 59. Id. at 426 (“I do expect a tipping point, where it becomes perfectly clear to the broader 
business community that their interests demand the full-scale imposition of collective action 
waivers . . . . Most likely, this watershed moment will be precipitated by a major court 
decision . . . .”). 
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down the collective action waiver while enforcing the remainder of the 
agreement to arbitrate? Indeed, some courts did just that, managing to 
simultaneously offer protection of collective rights and convey respect to 
arbitration.60 They accomplished that by invalidating the collective action 
waiver while compelling arbitration that allowed collectivity through 
class arbitration.61 Revealingly, when corporations realized that they 
might find themselves exposed to mass battles outside of court and 
without the protections that the public legal system offers to defendants, 
many of them lost interest in committing to arbitration,62 demonstrating 
that this alternative dispute resolution method was not really what they 
were looking for when they added to their contracts “arbitration” 
clauses.63 Such corporate response offers historical support to the current 
argument that, in many cases, arbitration clauses were merely a tool to 
achieve an anti-collective goal. 
A recent empirical study further bolsters this point. It describes the 
practice that corporations developed to include a non-severability 
provision in their arbitration clauses.64 Such a provision clarifies that in 
case of invalidation of the desirable component—the collective action 
waiver—the entire agreement to arbitrate should not be enforced.65 In 
other words, in their contractual relationships with those with less 
bargaining power, corporations have demonstrated much more interest in 
avoiding the need to deal with collectives than an investment in 
arbitration.66 Or, as Professor Gilles phrased it back in 2005: “[B]efore 
the collective action waiver issue arose, arbitration did not matter 
all that much.”67 
And then came the “tectonic shift”68: The one legal decision that more 
than ever before embraced and actively advanced the project of 
separating claimants, leaving them too isolated to pursue their rights. In 
the now-famous 2011 Supreme Court decision of AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
 
 60. See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding 
a class action waiver “violate[d] fundamental notions of fairness”). 
 61. E.g., id. at 1101–02. 
 62. Gilles, supra note 47, at 410. 
 63. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor 
Movement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1682, 1691 (2014) (“Arbitration is not a panacea for employers.”).  
 64. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. 
REV. 1, 40. 
 65. See Tippett & Schaaff, supra note 32, at 493–95; see also Rutledge & Drahozal, supra 
note 64, at 40 (reporting in the context of credit cards that “[s]lightly under half of the 
clauses . . . from issuers with slightly more than half the market share . . . contained an ‘anti-
severability provision’”).  
 66. Tippett & Schaaff, supra note 32, at 493 (arguing that the inclusion of a severability 
provision “suggests that the company is using the arbitration clause primarily or exclusively for 
the class action waiver”). 
 67. Gilles, supra note 47, at 427. 
 68. Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 4. 
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Concepcion (Concepcion),69 the Court removed most of the uncertainty 
that had previously made corporations hesitate regarding the strategy of 
adding arbitration clauses to their contracts in order to bury within them 
collective action waivers. In this 5–4 decision, the Court dramatically 
expanded the coverage of the FAA and reinterpreted it as powerful 
enough to prevent lower courts from invalidating collective action 
waivers.70 In doing so, the Court took away the judicial power of lower 
courts to protect collectivity, siding with corporations’ interest to avoid 
liability by using the method of “divide and conquer.” 
It is invaluable to recognize that Concepcion was not purely a legal 
development by an activist judiciary, but rather a product of an intentional 
joint effort of some of the leading corporations in America. The goal was 
to devastate collective actions by devising a new weapon against them. 
According to the findings of a New York Times special investigation,  in 
July 1999, a consortium of legal teams of leading corporations began a 
series of meetings to strategize about how “to kill class actions.”71 Among 
the participants in the meetings were representatives of powerful 
corporations such as American Express,72 which will later star in one of 
the revolution’s cases. Legal teams from leading banks such as Bank of 
America, Chase, Citigroup, and powerful corporations such as Sears, 
Toyota, and General Electric were present at the meeting as well.73 
Interestingly, at the time of the first meeting, American Express had 
already invented and implemented the practice of avoiding collective 
actions.74 Its standard contract stated that the company “may elect to 
resolve any claim by individual arbitration.”75  
Significant to the inception of the revolution at the Supreme Court, 
also in attendance were representatives of Discover Bank,76 the 
corporation that a few years later would be responsible for the birth and 
brief life of the “Discover Bank Rule.”77 Although at the time of the first 
meeting of the consortium Discover Bank did not yet include class action 
waivers in its standard contracts, it adopted them within several months, 
possibly influenced by American Express and other consortium members 
 
 69. 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 70. See id. at 351–52 (holding that the FAA preempts state law). 
 71. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 24. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (quoting Am. Express). 
 76. Id. 
 77. This rule worked for a while to justify invalidation of collective action waiver when 
their practical meaning was denial of redress, but was later rejected in Concepcion. See AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340, 352 (2011). 
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that had previously used the practice.78 But then, in 2002, when Discover 
Bank was sued for a wrongful charge of fees and tried to avoid liability 
by preventing class action based on the above waivers, California’s 
Fourth District Court of Appeal refused to enforce them.79 It reasoned 
that the waivers were akin to a “license to push the boundaries of good 
business practices to their furthest limits.”80 Discover Bank did not give 
up and petitioned the Supreme Court seeking intervention.81 Remarkably, 
at this point the company was represented by then-lawyer John Roberts, 
who would later become the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, taking 
an active part in forever changing the status of collective action waivers.82 
In any case, in 2002, while still a prominent defense attorney, and armed 
with advice from the organizer of the strategic consortium,83 he wrote that 
invalidating collective action waivers “contravenes the central purpose of 
the Arbitration Act: enforcing arbitration agreements according to their 
terms.”84  
Although the Court denied the petition, these words—and the idea that 
state courts must enforce collective action waivers—became the law of 
the land nine years later in Concepcion, when the man who had penned 
them was already at the other side of the bench. Perfectly echoing Chief 
Justice Roberts older petition, Justice Scalia decided for the first time that 
state courts can no longer do to corporations what they did in 2002 to 
Discover Bank, because “[t]he ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to 
‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to 
their terms.’”85 The organized effort of the 1999 corporate consortium 
had finally succeeded. 
After Concepcion, several other Supreme Court decisions followed, 
removing any remaining uncertainties regarding the scope of Concepcion 
and the power of class action waivers to separate people. First in the series 
was American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant (“Italian Colors”).86 
It removed the argument that even after Concepcion, collective action 
waivers may be invalidated if they patently leave no way for claimants to 
vindicate their statutory rights.87 Corporations were now expressly 
 
 78. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 24 (“Of the companies participating, only 
American Express and First USA had adopted an arbitration clause banning class actions; months 
later, Discover Bank added its own.”). 
 79. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 24. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, Discover Szetela, 537 U.S. 1226 (No. 02-829). 
 85. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
 86. 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
 87. Id. at 236–37, 239. 
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allowed to draft their contracts in a way that aims at escaping liability. 
Symbolically, the direct beneficiary of the decision was American 
Express—a member of the 1999 consortium that had tried for many years 
to find a way to avoid liability by using the special protections awarded 
to arbitration. And yet, for a while, and until 2018, there was still a reason 
to believe that the judicial approval of collective action waivers against 
consumers (Concepcion) and small businesses (Italian Colors) would not 
be further extended to the employment setting. Although the Supreme 
Court’s “tortured reading” of the FAA already “opened the floodgates for 
enforcement of arbitration agreements imposed on employees as a 
condition of employment,”88 there was nonetheless a lingering doubt 
regarding employers’ ability to force their employees via the use of 
waivers to give up class arbitration.89  
In the case of employment, the new reading of the FAA seemed to 
stand in direct conflict with another veteran federal act: the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Given the gap of power between 
employers and employees, the legislature has explicitly expressed its care 
for “the individual unorganized worker [who] is commonly helpless”90 
and thus has sought to protect employees’ ability to band together. 
Particularly, § 7 of the NLRA91 awards employees “the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”92 Indeed, a 
year after Concepcion, the National Labor Relations Board decided that 
collective action waivers that prevent class claims in both judicial and 
arbitral forums violate the NLRA because their goal is to avoid a type of 
concerted activity that the statute protects.93 To add to the confusion, 
courts around the country responded in conflicting ways to the Board’s 
position regarding the conflict between the FAA and the NLRA—some 
rejecting it and others approving it.94 The question regarding the validity 
 
 88. Hodges, supra note 63, at 1685 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S 105, 
118–19 (2001)).  
 89. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. CV 16-577-DMG (KSx), 2016 WL 9110161, at *7 
(C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016) (stating that, given the support of collectivity under the NLRA, class 
action waivers “in the employment context would likely not be enforceable”), rev’d, 771 F. App’x 
418 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 90. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1635 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)). 
 91. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). 
 92. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 93. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2280–81, 2286 (2012), granted in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 94. Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 4 (describing, for example, the conflict 
between the Second and Ninth Circuits).  
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of collective action waivers in the employment setting was left up in the 
air. 
But then the revolution progressed to remove the doubt. In Epic 
Systems Corp. v. Lewis (Epic),95 another 5–4 decision led by the 
conservative majority of the Supreme Court, the placement of collective 
action waivers within arbitration clauses led to prioritizing the FAA over 
the NLRA, thereby further legitimizing the use of isolation methods 
under the guise of enforcing arbitration clauses.96 Because the decision in 
Epic is very recent and directly relates to the value of collective actions, 
it is worth a closer look. 
The litigation that ended in the 2018 Epic decision started before 
Concepcion’s unconditional judicial embrace of collective action 
waivers. Back at that time, the validity of such waivers was still 
questionable. Employees of Ernst & Young, one of the largest accounting 
firms in the world, sued their powerful employer after “the firm had 
misclassified its junior accountants as professional employees,” thereby 
depriving them of overtime pay.97 The employees sought to resist the 
enforcement of the collective action waiver in their contracts and raised 
the same difficulty that existed in Concepcion and American Express.98 
They highlighted the fact that the separated claim of each of them was 
too small to allow an expensive individual pursuit of rights.99 Notably, 
this is an especially acute problem in the employment setting where 
disputes frequently arise from relatively modest wage-and-hour claims of 
underpaid employees.100 In the particular conflict between Ernst & 
Young and its junior accountants, for example, the value of the 
employees’ separate harms ranged between $2,000 and $29,000, but to 
prove each one of them alone (despite their identical nature) would have 
required an investment of about $200,000 per claimant.101 For that 
reason, the employees sought to unite efforts via a class action, whereas 
Ernst & Young tried to block them by enforcing the waivers in their 
contracts. 
At this time, before Concepcion, one New York federal district court 
considering the counterarguments of the parties concluded that 
“[e]nforcement of the class waiver provision in this case would 
effectively ban all proceedings by [the employee] against [Ernst & 
 
 95. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).  
 96. Id. at 1642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 1620 (majority opinion). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 100. Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Epic Backslide: The Supreme Court 
Endorses Mandatory Individual Arbitration Agreements—#TimesUp on Workers’ Rights, 15 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 43, 45 (2019).  
 101. Id. at 66. 
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Young].”102 The same court further highlighted the injustice that would 
have followed by explaining that while the employee “[would] be unable 
to pursue her claims, even if they are meritorious,” Ernst & Young would 
“enjoy de facto immunity from liability for alleged violations of the labor 
laws.”103 In a strong demonstration of the influence of Concepcion and 
American Express, a district court in California in 2013 facing the same 
counterarguments in an identical dispute between Ernst & Young and its 
underpaid accountants reached the opposite conclusion.104 Following 
Concepcion, this court concluded that the inability to pursue rights 
individually due to the prohibitive cost of separate proceedings could not 
justify the invalidation of collective action waivers.105 Both the New 
York case and the California case were appealed and both were reversed, 
leaving the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit in conflict,106 thereby 
opening the gate for another watershed Supreme Court decision. 
Following the unprecedented expansion of the FAA in Concepcion 
and American Express by the late Justice Scalia, his replacement, Justice 
Gorsuch, decided in Epic that in the clash between two federal laws—the 
FAA and NLRA—the former governs.107 The process of failing claimants 
by separating them with collective action waivers that enjoy the FAA’s 
protection had been completed. As a result, consumers, small businesses, 
employees, and many others who were somehow subjected to such 
waivers no longer have effective recourse in all the countless cases in 
which the cost of separate proceedings is prohibitive. With the active help 
of the Supreme Court, corporations had found a way to carefully plan a 
world in which as long as they cause smaller harms to numerous victims, 
no one will be able to hold them accountable. As the next section will 
show, the real motivation to “divide and conquer” becomes even more 
apparent when looking at the parallel process that has developed in cases 
in which corporations did not add collective action waivers to their 
contracts.  
C.  Separation via Interpretation of Silent Arbitration Clauses 
Many jurists and scholars discuss the increased enforcement of class 
action waivers and the intensified judicial prevention of class arbitration 
 
 102. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d, 
726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 103. Id.  
 104. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. C-12-04964 RMW, 2013 WL 3460052, at *3, *10 
(N.D. Cal. July 9, 2013), rev’d, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Epic Sys. Corp. v. 
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 105. See id. at *4–7 (discussing whether arbitration is prohibitively expensive).  
 106. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 4. 
 107. Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1642. 
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when no such waivers exist without differentiating the two situations.108 
However, for the task taken up in this Article—to better trace the progress 
of a separation process and its consequences—it is valuable to distinguish 
the pair. Critical Supreme Court cases that have played an active role in 
the development of isolation methods under the pretext of “favoring 
arbitration”109 were not at all similar to Concepcion, American Express, 
or Epic, as they did not focus on the enforcement of collective action 
waivers. Instead, in the last decade, and confusingly during the same 
period, a distinct line of cases arose. These cases contributed to the 
separation effect of arbitration clauses by merely interpreting them as 
blocking claimants from banding together even though they did not 
include any express waiver of collective action.  This Article will call this 
line of cases the “interpretation cases” to distinguish them from the 
“waiver cases” discussed in the previous section. 
Unlike ever before, the last decade has brought about a growing 
willingness of the Court to read “silent” arbitration clauses—devoid of a 
waiver of aggregate proceedings—as if they explicitly included such a 
waiver. The bellwether of the interpretation cases is Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. (Stolt-Nielsen)110—a Supreme Court case that 
was decided on April 27, 2010, exactly a year before Concepcion.111 The 
litigation arose after a group of shipping companies (collectively, Stolt-
Nielsen) was found by the Department of Justice to be involved in an 
illegal price-fixing conspiracy.112 One harmed customer that had 
overpaid for ocean transportation services, a company named 
AnimalFeeds, filed a putative class action in court.113 However, because 
the parties included an arbitration clause in their contract, the dispute was 
eventually sent, with other similar cases, to arbitration.114 
When AnimalFeeds filed a demand for class arbitration, Stolt-Nielsen 
objected and insisted that AnimalFeeds alone should carry any 
 
 108. See, e.g., Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 5 n.26 (listing thirteen cases that 
form the new arbitration jurisprudence without differentiating); see also Hodges, supra note 63, 
at 1687–88 (lumping together Concepcion and Italian Colors, which discuss class action waivers, 
with Stolt-Nielsen, discussed below, that had no waiver). But see David Horton, Clause 
Construction: A Glimpse into Judicial and Arbitral Decision-Making, 68 DUKE L. J. 1323, 1325 
(2019) (differentiating between “two major ways” of expanding the FAA). For an example of a 
judicial recognition of the difference, see Oregel v. PacPizza, LLC, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 448 
(Ct. App. 2015), where a California Court of Appeals recognized that “Concepcion [i]s irrelevant” 
if an arbitration clause “d[oes] not contain a class action waiver.”    
 109. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (2011) (quoting Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
 110. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).   
 111. Id.  
 112. Horton, supra note 108, at 1349. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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arbitration.115 At this point, the parties agreed to submit this threshold 
dispute to a panel of three arbitrators that unanimously decided that the 
parties’ arbitration clause allowed the arbitration to proceed as a class 
arbitration.116 The panel reasoned that since the arbitration clause was 
silent against a background in which class arbitrations are a common 
practice, the collective method could be used.117 However, when the case 
arrived at the Supreme Court, Justice Alito was not convinced. He 
concluded that the entire decision of the panel rested merely on the public 
policy of favoring class arbitrations and as such amounted to a forbidden 
exercise of the panel’s power.118 
Had the Court stopped at awarding a loss to the party seeking a class 
arbitration, Stolt-Nielsen would probably not have gained its high status 
in the pantheon of the new arbitration jurisprudence. Indeed, for many 
years after the publication of the decision, many courts took Stolt-Nielsen 
to be limited by its relatively rare facts of sophisticated parties that 
stipulated that both of them never gave even implied consent to aggregate 
procedures.119 But what makes Stolt-Nielsen in retrospect so crucial to 
the separation project discussed here is the fact that the Court did not stop 
at settling the particular dispute. Instead, in an activist move, Justice Alito 
insisted on using the case to introduce a new and hostile view of banding 
together in arbitrations. 
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court started to develop the argument that “class 
arbitration” is an oxymoron or an abnormality, suggesting an inherent 
discrepancy between the idea of arbitration and collectivity. Without 
citing to any supporting resources, Justice Alito stated that “class-action 
arbitration changes the nature of arbitration” and added that the 
differences between individual arbitration and class arbitration are just 
“too great.”120 The idea that class is not a legitimate type of arbitration of 
the kind protected by the FAA was not only unprecedented; it also 
conflicted with the reality at the time of the decision. Ever since the 
1980s, certainly during the 2000s, including in 2010, and indeed even in 
the years after Stolt-Nielsen, class arbitrations have been in full use.121 
Further, the leading arbitration providers not only have long offered class 
arbitrations; they also have created and published elaborate rules 
designed to institutionalize this way of dispute resolution.122 In fact, in 
 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 1349–50. 
 117. Id. at 1350.  
 118. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 677 (2010).  
 119. See Horton, supra note 108, at 1351–53 (describing the confusion). 
 120. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685–87.  
 121. See Horton, supra note 108, at 1349 (presenting data released by the AAA); see also 
Alyssa S. King, Too Much Power and Not Enough: Arbitrators Face the Class Dilemma, 21 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1031, 1037 (2017) (describing the history of class arbitration). 
 122. King, supra note 121, at 1039–40; see also Horton, supra note 108, at 1349. 
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2003, the Court explicitly confirmed the authority of arbitrators to decide 
the availability of class arbitration proceedings in situations in which the 
arbitration clause lacked a collective action waiver.123 And, all these 
years, neither arbitrators nor judges have expressed doubt regarding the 
general fit between arbitrations and aggregate proceedings. The decision 
in Stolt-Nielsen was in that respect “revolutionary.” 
Exactly a year after Stolt-Nielsen, in Concepcion, the Court 
enthusiastically adopted the new ostracizing of class arbitrations, this 
time in the context of the waiver cases. The late Justice Scalia set the 
tone, and his bluntness added an edge to Justice Alito’s innovation. The 
unique rhetoric he used and what it reveals will be further explored in the 
next Part. For now, however, the point is more descriptive: the process of 
making class arbitrations seem inadequate started at Stolt-Nielsen and 
was significantly amplified in Concepcion. Post-2011, many have 
predicted that the two cases together “would effectively end the use of 
class arbitration.”124 In reality, however, as the opening story of Frank 
Varela demonstrates, class arbitrations remained both desirable and 
available. 
Then, in 2013, only ten days before the decision in Italian Colors, 
which further fortified Concepcion in the line of the waiver cases, the 
Court released a ruling in another interpretation case. The new 
interpretation case—Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter125—was factually 
similar to Stolt-Nielsen, but it did not feature any stipulation between the 
parties regarding the silence of their agreement.126 This time, the Court 
affirmed an arbitrator’s decision to interpret a broadly phrased arbitration 
clause as reflecting consent to class arbitration.127 It was a rare 9–0 
decision, and none of the Justices mentioned the argument that class 
arbitration is not truly a form of arbitration.128 Perhaps encouraged by the 
deference of the Court in Oxford Health Plans, arbitrators continued to 
permit class arbitrations in cases of broadly phrased arbitration clauses. 
However, a 2017 empirical study of sixty-four arbitral decisions that were 
published after Stolt-Nielsen and before the end of 2015 shows the 
immense impact of the Court’s new hostility to class arbitration, 
documenting a sharp decline in arbitrators’ willingness to permit class 
 
 123. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447, 452–53 (2003).  
 124. King, supra note 121, at 1042 & n.72 (describing the response and citing articles to that 
effect). 
 125. 569 U.S. 564 (2013).   
 126. See id. at 567. 
 127. Id. at 566, 573. 
 128. The only (quite subtle) hint in this direction was in Justice Alito’s concurrence, in which 
he noted that, because in arbitration class members can enjoy a win but avoid a loss if they do not 
opt in before a decision is made, the Court may need to reconsider whether “the availability of 
class arbitration is a question the arbitrator should decide.” Id. at 575. 
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arbitration.129 It took six more years for the crusade on class arbitrations 
in the context of the interpretation cases to resume.130  
And then, following the footsteps of the latest waiver case—the 2018 
Epic decision—came the newest development in the interpretation cases: 
the 2019 decision in Lamps Plus.131 As we have seen, in this decision, the 
Court ordered that Frank Varela and some 1,300 employees of the 
national company Lamps Plus could not band together to seek redress 
from their employer for severely compromising their personal and 
financial data.132 The 5–4 decision in Lamps Plus does to the strand of 
interpretation cases what Epic has done to the line of waiver cases: 
removing any remaining arguments that former cases were somehow 
limited by their context and left some room for legitimate collective 
action. The novelty of the decision in Lamps Plus and its unprecedented 
demonstration of bias against collectivity call for a closer look. 
The story of the dispute discussed in Lamps Plus opened this Article. 
As Justice Ginsburg commented in her dissent, it is a story that “cries out 
for collective treatment.”133 The harm to Frank Varela and his coworkers 
originated from one identical incident: a single email that was sent by a 
senior employee to a hacker and exposed the most private details of each 
and every employee.134 The consequences of this event were dire and 
similar for each employee: long-term exposure to abuse of the data by an 
unlimited amount of its receivers.135 And, despite the magnitude of the 
event, Lamps Plus offered all the victims the same unsuitable solution of 
one year of free identity monitoring services.136 It is, therefore, 
particularly hard to see what is “inefficient” in consolidating about 1,300 
identical claims, all resulting from one data breach. On the contrary, it 
seems illogical and wasteful to require each employee to pay a separate 
lawyer and independently prove what happened. And yet, to a corporation 
determined to avoid liability and to a Court resolved to eradicate class 
arbitrations—none of this seemed to matter. 
After two lower courts authorized class arbitration, the Court reversed 
and insisted that Frank Varela and his numerous coworkers must seek 
justice separately.137 This conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts explained, 
 
 129. King, supra note 121, at 1044 (describing a decline from a high permission rate at the 
level of 90% (or about 70%) of the cases to a low permission rate of only 45%). 
 130. Ten days after Oxford Health Plans, Justice Scalia’s decision in American Express was 
published. It included abundant citations from Concepcion and another fierce attack on class 
arbitrations.  
 131. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
 132. Id. at1419. 
 133. Id. at 1421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 1412 (majority opinion). 
 135. See id. at 1413.  
 136. Class Action Complaint, supra note 2, at 4. 
 137. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1413, 1419. 
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accepts as a starting point that the arbitration clause that Lamps Plus 
included in its standard contracts was ambiguous.138 Such a starting point 
should have set the case apart from Stolt-Nielsen, in which the parties did 
not argue for two opposing interpretations. However, the glaring 
difference did not strike Chief Justice Roberts as significant. To him, 
while regular contractual ambiguity calls for interpretation that attempts 
to “ascertain[]” one of the two competing meanings of the disputed 
contractual language,139 ambiguity in the arbitration context should work 
differently.140 In the case of arbitration clauses, explained Chief Justice 
Roberts for the first time, courts are not free to approach the interpretation 
task with their usual impartiality.141 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts 
maintained that when considering whether an ambiguous arbitration 
clause reflects an intention to allow or ban collective proceedings, “it is 
important to recognize the ‘fundamental’ difference between class 
arbitration and the individualized form of arbitration envisioned by the 
FAA.”142  
In other words, courts and arbitrators should start from a preference 
to not allow class arbitrations because, since 2010, those had been marked 
as not deserving the protection of the FAA. For that reason, writes Chief 
Justice Roberts, “ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to 
conclude that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to ‘sacrifice[] the 
principal advantage of arbitration.’”143 The innovative declaration that 
ambiguity is not enough to open the way to class arbitration leaves no 
escape from asking what might be enough. On this point, the Court has 
reached a new peak in the separation process. For the first time in the 
history of the FAA, it clarified that once an arbitration clause is included 
in a contract the only way to allow class arbitration is “an affirmative 
‘contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.’”144  
Although Chief Justice Roberts has probably tried to conceal it,145 the 
word “affirmative” in the sentence cited above is not part of any previous 
 
 138. Id. at 1414–15. 
 139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of its meaning.”). 
 140. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1414–15. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1416 (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622–23 (2018)). 
 143. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 
348 (2011)). 
 144. Id. (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010)).  
 145. See id. Chief Justice Roberts used the past tense of “we held” in the full sentence, 
suggesting that the entire sentence is a product of previous holdings. Here is the full sentence 
including the citation of Stolt-Nielsen: “And for that reason, we held that courts may not infer 
consent to participate in class arbitration absent an affirmative ‘contractual basis for concluding 
that the party agreed to do so.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684).  
23
Keren: Divided and Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and Emotional Consequ
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
598 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
decision of the Court. Significantly, this word is the newest layer of the 
arbitration revolution. The rule coming from Stolt-Nielsen required “a 
contractual basis for concluding that [a] party agreed [to class 
arbitration].”146 Chief Justice Roberts repeated it, citing Stolt-Nielsen to 
create an impression of continuation, but added before it—not once but 
twice147—a single adjective that forms a significant shift. This stealth 
modification of the Stolt-Nielsen rule turns a so-called ambiguous 
arbitration clause—one that is phrased very broadly without banning 
class arbitration—into a clear one. From now on, we are told, any 
phrasing that does not “affirmatively” express consent of the drafting 
party to subject itself to collective challenges should be read as if it were 
straightforwardly carrying the opposite message: class arbitration is 
forbidden.148 By merely adding one word to an older precedent, Chief 
Justice Roberts set isolation as the new default rule. 
Given the zero probability that corporations will ever express an 
affirmative consent to class arbitration,149 we have now completed a full 
circle: we started from corporations adding arbitration clauses to their 
mass contracts in order to hide within them collective action waivers, and 
now the mere existence of an arbitration clause—one that does not even 
include a waiver—leads to the same result. Requiring “affirmative” 
consent to class arbitration, therefore, transforms naked arbitration 
clauses and the very idea of arbitration into a direct method of separating 
claimants, even without saying a word about it. As a result, anyone who, 
like Frank Varela, signed an arbitration clause because he or she had no 
other choice is also taken as someone who signed off any right to band 
together with others. Note the biased treatment of consent that follows. 
While the Court refuses to take into account corporations’ implied 
consent (only their “affirmative” consent will count), it is more than eager 
to rely on the implied consent of the other party to the contract. Once 
people like Frank Varela have signed on the dotted line of an arbitration 
clause, the Court assumes that they also have given their implied consent 
to waiving their collective rights. In short, implied consent works only to 
separate people. 
Why did Chief Justice Roberts make such an effort to weave the word 
“affirmative” into the original text of Stolt-Nielsen? It is because Lamps 
Plus, like other drafters of mass contracts that use arbitration clauses that 
do not contain a collective action waiver, would have lost without this 
added word. One leading reason is the maxim of contra proferentem, an 
interpretation rule that guides judges to hold contractual ambiguities 
 
 146. Id. at 1412 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684). 
 147. Id. at 1416, 1419 (repeating the word “affirmative”).  
 148. Id.  
 149. See Horton, supra note 108, at 1346 (suggesting that affirmative consent to class 
arbitration does not exist).  
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against the drafter of the contract and accordingly to award unclear terms 
the meaning suggested by the non-drafting party.150 This rule, known to 
any first-year student of contract law, is applied under two cumulative 
conditions: that the drafting party chose the ambiguous language and that 
this party enjoyed superiority of power that did not allow the other party 
to clarify it. Both conditions can be easily satisfied in the relationship 
between Lamps Plus, the drafter, and Frank Varela, its warehouse 
employee. More generally, they can similarly be met anytime that 
corporations are drafting contracts of adhesion to impose arbitration on 
their many consumers, workers, suppliers, and others. Accordingly, 
under contra proferentem, corporate drafters who did not include a 
waiver in their standard arbitration clause should be taken as implicitly 
agreeing to class arbitration. 
Determined to block class arbitrations, Chief Justice Roberts was 
willing to undo centuries of common law to remove the risk of 
collectivity that comes from the rule of contra proferentem. Adding one 
more extension to the already-expanded FAA, Chief Justice Roberts 
therefore opined that the FAA preempts not only state law or federal 
legislation that threatens the operation of arbitrations, but also the general 
rule of contra proferentem.151 Chief Justice Roberts further reasoned that 
applying the traditional common law rule would produce, by way of 
interpretation, an implied consent to class arbitration; while, according to 
the Court’s latest decision, such consent “is inconsistent with the 
FAA.”152  
D.  Deliberate Separation 
To be sure, other scholars have concluded before that a leading effect 
of the so-called arbitration revolution amounts to a demise of the ability 
of claimants to protect their rights by banding together. Professor David 
Horton recently summarized the works that recognized such effect, 
writing: “Concepcion and its progeny have sounded ‘the death knell for 
consumer and employment class actions.’”153 Nevertheless, the current 
analysis seeks to go beyond identifying the practical effect of the 
revolution. With the advantage of seeing one more piece of the puzzle—
the 2019 Lamps Plus decision—it reveals that the “death knell” is a 
product of a deliberate separation process promoted by organized 
 
 150. Another reason arises from the prevalence of collective action waivers throughout the 
years relevant to the dispute. 
 151. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 152. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011)). 
 153. Horton, supra note 108, at 1326 (quoting Maureen A. Weston, The Clash: Squaring 
Mandatory Arbitration with Administrative Agency and Representative Recourse, 89 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 103, 116 (2015)); see id. at 1326 n.17 (citing many other articles). 
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corporate interests and perpetuated by the Court in two parallel lines of 
cases.   
Consider, for example, reading the most recent decisions in Epic and 
Lamps Plus together. Combined, they mean that in 2019, almost a decade 
after the release of Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, the mere inclusion of 
an arbitration clause is enough to fail claimants’ efforts to band together, 
with (Epic) or without (Lamps Plus) a waiver. The fact that the duo has 
emerged at the employment setting—once a natural domain of solidarity 
and collective rights—further highlights the magnitude of the assault on 
collectivity. Significantly, in terms of their legal reasoning, these cases 
are hard to reconcile. On the one hand, Epic prevents collective actions 
through waivers that are served on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and are thus 
supported by a very weak consent of employees. On the other hand, 
Lamps Plus reaches the same separating result by insisting that when it 
comes to employers, only a strong (“affirmative”) consent will do. How 
can weak consent justify compelling individual arbitrations but not class 
arbitrations? The only way to explain the two cases together, and indeed 
the entire revolution, is thus to recognize that the newest decisions reflect 
an intentional use of the FAA not to treat arbitration favorably but to 
disfavor collective actions. 
Before closing the discussion of the arbitration revolution as a 
separation process, a note about judicial activism is in place. In deciding 
the waiver cases in accordance with corporations’ interests, the Court can 
be viewed as merely having a participatory role in the separation process. 
However, in deciding the interpretation cases, the Court should be 
recognized as leading the process, helping even corporations that failed 
to draft their contracts carefully. Because they involve rare interventions 
in arbitral decisions and work to prevent arbitrations, the interpretation 
cases substantiate, even more than the waiver cases, the general argument 
in this Part: that behind the façade of supporting arbitration rests an 
activist jurisprudence that aims at separating claimants in the service of 
corporate interests.154 The next Part links the increasing hostility to 
collectivity and the resulting separation process to the rising dominance 
of neoliberalism.   
II.  JOINING THE NEOLIBERAL PROJECT 
While the previous Part described how two lines of cases, seemingly 
dedicated to arbitration, converge to create a separation effect, this Part’s 
focus is on the role of discourse and ideology. What comes next 
 
 154. NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS 228–29 (2017) (pointing out the irony in that 
“after years of criticizing ‘judicial activism’ by the Supreme Court for greater equity, Koch 
grantees are now making, as one Cato publication puts it, the Case for an Activist Judiciary to 
secure economic liberty”). 
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establishes that the arbitration revolution is not merely, and perhaps not 
even primarily, a legal shift. Rather, the anti-collective approach and the 
isolation it imposes are essential features of a greater transformative 
change: the rise to dominance of neoliberalism and the creation of a 
corporatized political economy. The result is an important 
reconceptualization of the arbitration revolution as both a product of 
neoliberal rationality and a tool for further constituting neoliberal 
hegemony.  
A.  Law as Discourse 
In its embellished reading of the FAA, the Court’s conservative 
majority has not only dramatically changed the law regarding the 
availability of collective proceedings; it also has developed a new 
framework and original uses of terminologies to reason about the shift. 
As a result, the arbitration revolution presents a risk that reaches beyond 
its practical outcomes and goes deeper and further to intervene in 
people’s perception of reality.  Exposing this layer requires revisiting the 
leading decisions that mark the arbitration revolution to track nuances of 
tone and particular linguistic choices. On this discursive front, the late 
Justice Scalia was a pioneer and a dominant leader. His rhetorical moves, 
chiefly in writing for the majority in Concepcion, have been heavily cited 
in later decisions and have utterly transformed the conversation. 
In broad strokes, the new discourse used to promote separation draws 
on neoliberal ideas and particularly on neoliberalism’s long history of 
vilifying solidarities. But, even more importantly, this discourse also 
plays an active role in disseminating neoliberal logic with the power and 
authority unique to law. This dissemination effect is what makes the anti-
collective ideas spread by the Court reach far beyond the claimants that 
pragmatically lose access to justice. All people contractually involved 
with large corporations—and that means all of us—have been exposed in 
the last decades to a powerful message that delegitimizes coming together 
in response to being wronged. Exposing the roots of such a message, and 
how the Supreme Court became one of its messengers, is a key to better 
understanding the full influence of the arbitration revolution.   
B.  Neoliberalism and the Revolution’s Discourse  
The attack on collective actions through the expansion of the FAA has 
not happened in a vacuum. Rather, the legal war against collectivity has 
also targeted class actions that are divorced from arbitration155 and labor 
unions.156 Further, and most importantly, the entire battle has 
 
 155. See, e.g., Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 868–69 (2016).  
 156. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Martin H. Malin, After Janus, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1821, 
1823 (2019).  
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coincided—both chronologically and ideologically—with the rising 
dominance of neoliberal ideas in the United States in the last four 
decades.157 
Although we all know that we live in the midst of the neoliberal age, 
the meaning of the term seems to remain “perplexingly elusive.”158 
Hence, the following exploration of how neoliberalism has both incited 
the arbitration revolution and benefited from it compels an effort to 
clarify what neoliberalism is and how it reached its status as the most 
dominant political project of our era.159 One necessary step in this 
direction is to remove a common confusion that originates in the word 
itself.160 Neoliberalism should not be minimized into a new variation of 
a liberal economic approach,161 an observation that has several concrete 
manifestations that are highly relevant to our discussion. The first is the 
political nature of the neoliberal project.162 In the American context, 
 
 157. See WENDY BROWN, IN THE RUINS OF NEOLIBERALISM 21 (2019) (discussing “the 
neoliberal transformations taking place around the world in the past four decades”); see also Hila 
Keren, Valuing Emotions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 864 (2018) (“Intellectually, 
neoliberalism may have been founded in Europe by Friedreich Hayek about seventy-five years 
ago, but its practical rise in the Anglo-American world is associated more with the 1980s, under 
the leadership and policies of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.” (footnote omitted)). 
 158. Jamie Peck, Preface: Naming Neoliberalism, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
NEOLIBERALISM xxii (Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, Martijn Konings & David Primrose eds., 
2018). 
 159. See Philip Mirowski, Hell Is Truth Seen Too Late, BOUNDARY, Feb. 2019, at  46 
(describing the criticism against the use of “neoliberalism” but insisting that “[a]wareness of the 
philosophical core of neoliberalism—namely, the epistemic superiority of the market in all 
things—is a necessary prerequisite to understanding some of the most crucial developments in 
contemporary politics”); see also BROWN, supra note 157, at 17 (“Neoliberalism—the ideas, the 
institutions, the policies, the political rationality—has, along with its spawn, financialization, 
likely shaped recent world history as profoundly as any other nameable phenomenon in the same 
period, even if scholars continue to debate precisely what both are.”). 
 160. Part of the reason for this confusion is explained by MacLean as follows:  
Members of the Mont Pelerin Society initially chose to refer to themselves as 
“neoliberals,” to signal the way they were retooling nineteenth-century pro-
market ideas; it’s the name applied to them today by critics of the policies they 
advocated. But the word “neoliberal” confused Americans because Democrats 
in the Roosevelt mold now had such a hammerlock on the word “liberal.”  
MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 51. 
 161. S. M. AMADAE, PRISONERS OF REASON: GAME THEORY AND NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 11–12 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he shift in orientation from liberalism to neoliberalism 
is sufficiently stark” to call for a discussion of the differences). 
 162. See, e.g., Philip Mirowski, The Political Movement That Dared Not Speak Its Own 
Name: The Neoliberal Thought Collective Under Erasure 2 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, 
Working Paper No. 23, 2014) (criticizing in a general way those who refuse to recognize 
neoliberalism as a political project and defining it as “a thought collective and political movement 
combined”), https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP23-Mirowski.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/UJ9E-TPN2]. 
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while both democrats and republicans are liberals in the sense of 
believing in the necessity of capitalist economy and free markets, 
neoliberalism better correlates with the interests and beliefs of those on 
the right-wing of the political map, including libertarians and 
conservatives.163 And, as we shall see, this orientation is not fortuitous 
but rather a product of a comprehensive and coordinated effort. 
It is thus not an accident that the conservative majority of the Court 
has executed the revolution. It is also not an accident that the Justices that 
authored the revolution’s leading cases have been all affiliated with and 
supported by the neoliberal Federalist Society. The Society, which was 
established in 1982, just as neoliberalism had started to rise to 
prominence in the United States, is the legal arm of what historian Philip 
Mirowski has titled “the Neoliberal Thought Collective”164—the 
infrastructure through which neoliberals have calculatingly—albeit 
stealthily—built up their movement’s “knowledge production and 
political action capacities.”165 
For example, Justice Scalia, undoubtedly the leader of the revolution, 
was probably “the most important elite sponsor of the Society” since its 
early days—at the time during which he was a mentor and advisor to the 
student founders of the Society as a faculty member at the Chicago 
School of Law.166 In 1987, when “the Federalist Society hosted its first-
ever national lawyers convention at the Mayflower Hotel” in 
Washington, D.C., Justice Scalia was the first speaker on a panel 
dedicated to “Methods of Statutory Construction.”167 He ended his talk 
predicting that “in the future” courts will interpret statutes based more on 
“objective analysis” and “less [on] legislative history,”168 foretelling how 
in the 2000s he would expand the reading of the FAA while setting aside 
 
 163. Peck, supra note 158, at xxvi. This is not to say that neoliberalism did not influence the 
left. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Philip Mirowsky, Neoliberalism: The Movement that Dare Not Speak its Name, 
AMERICAN AFFAIRS (2018), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/neoliberalism-movement-
dare-not-speak-name/ [https://perma.cc/D7AM-V49V]. 
 166. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 141 (2008) 
(describing Justice Scalia’s many contributions including fundraising, speaking at the first 
conference, and hosting Society members at his home).  
 167. Methods of Statutory Construction [Archive Collection]: 1987 National Lawyers 
Convention, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 30, 1987, 12:00 PM), https://fedsoc.org/events/methods-of-
statutory-construction-archive-collection [https://perma.cc/G275-XUCG]. 
 168. The Federalist Soc’y, 1987 Annual Lawyers Convention: Methods of Statutory 
Construction [Archive Collection], YOUTUBE (May 3, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
time_continue=2465&v=xDcXOAnbSuA&feature=emb_logo [https://perma.cc/XW8W-KWXF] 
(beginning at 41:04 for quoted material). 
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the Act’s legislative history that clearly limited it to arbitration 
agreements between commercial parties of similar bargaining power.169 
The revolution’s other spearheads—Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Alito, and Justice Gorsuch—all have strong and continuous ties to the 
Federalist Society.170 And, while the Society is not openly and directly 
involved in politics, it does promote the dissemination of neoliberal logic 
via powerful and profound processes of education, training, and 
networking.171 The Society has therefore been an “organization of 
extraordinary consequence,” openly aiming to counter the liberal (taken 
as left-leaning) control of the legal profession.172 To say that the 
arbitration revolution is the brainchild of the stellar ambassadors of the 
Federalist Society is thus to recognize that the revolution itself is founded 
on neoliberal rationality and as such carries salient political weight. 
The second meaningful difference between liberalism and 
neoliberalism regards the role of the state and the relationship between 
the state and the market. Unlike liberals, neoliberals are not genuinely 
interested in the separation of the public state from the private market, 
even as they voice calls for a small government or non-interventionist 
state. Far from the model of Laissez-faire economics, neoliberalism 
requires the state “to actively promote and construct a free market 
society.”173 Neoliberalism thus reconfigures the liberal commitment of 
the state, profoundly transforming it from the duty to care for all its 
members and the common good174 to a narrower but active commitment 
to the most dominant market players: large businesses and financial 
 
 169. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S 105, 125–28 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing the application of the FAA to workers in accordance with the history of the statute).  
 170. See, e.g., AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST 
SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 3 (2017) (describing Justice Alito in 
tuxedo at the thirtieth anniversary of the Society). Further, according to the Federalist Society’s 
website, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia were both speakers at the 2007 National Lawyer 
Convention of the Society. See Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr.: Chief Justice of the United States, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc.org/contributors/john-roberts [https://perma.cc/AM56-WPN3]. 
Similarly, Justice Scalia was a speaker at the 2008 National Lawyer Convention of the Society. 
See 2008 National Lawyers Convention, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Nov. 20, 2008, 8:00 AM), 
https://fedsoc.org/events/2008-national-lawyers-convention [https://perma.cc/G56G-4ZNT]. 
Similarly, Justice Gorsuch is listed as a contributor on the Society’s website, see 
https://fedsoc.org/contributors/neil-gorsuch[https://perma.cc/T9JY-FLET]. 
 171. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 170, at 3. 
 172. TELES, supra note 166, at 135. 
 173. JULIE A. WILSON, NEOLIBERALISM 37 (2018). 
 174. See Sean Phelan & Simon Dawes, Liberalism and Neoliberalism, OXFORD RES. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (2018), https://oxfordre.com/communication/view/10.1093/acrefore/978019022 
8613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-176?rskey=pPx3Zm&result=1 [https://perma.cc/5F 
XC-BJXT] (describing how liberal philosophers like John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham 
approved state intervention on behalf of the worse-off members of society and how philosopher 
John Rawls linked freedom with equality and saw the market as part of society as well as an 
appropriate subject of social control). 
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elites.175 Generally speaking, this new orientation of the state explains 
many legal transformations of the last few decades.176 It also more 
concretely clarifies why the arbitration revolution so evidently sacrifices 
the interests of ordinary citizens to cater to the needs and interests of the 
largest businesses. 
A third theme of what differentiates neoliberal ideology from 
liberalism is the goal and practice of extending the logic of the market to 
all areas of life. Although liberals debate the extent to which public 
intervention in private markets is justified, they all seem to agree that 
some domains lie outside of the market and should be analyzed and 
organized according to noneconomic metrics. Neoliberalism, however, 
has deliberately produced a radical restructuring not only of the economy 
but also of non-market fields such as “politics, society, culture, and the 
environment.”177 It even has restructured our emotions.178 One scholar 
described the theoretical shift as a process in which “[m]arket ideas 
moved out of economics departments to become the new standard 
currency of the social sciences” until they “became fixtures of common 
sense.”179 
The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, one of the symbols of 
neoliberalism, once made a famous declaration of neoliberalism’s 
ambitious effort to establish itself as general common sense, stating that 
“[e]conomics are the method; [but] the object is to change the . . . soul.”180 
Accordingly, the neoliberal project uses many mediums through which it 
disseminates its logic until it can penetrate our subjectivities. One path to 
the soul is discourse—a set of communicative acts through which, in a 
complex social process, ideas get widely circulated, turn into “truths,” 
and become the “common sense.”181 And, once an idea becomes part of 
common sense, it is ready to be internalized, or, as Thatcher would have 
it, to change the soul. 
Crucially, as a forceful social institution that exerts authority and is 
trusted by many, the law can operate precisely in this way, and the 
 
 175. See WILSON, supra note 173, at 27; see also DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 33 (2005) (“In the event of a conflict between Main Street and Wall Street, the 
latter was to be favoured.”).  
 176. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, THE NEW ROBERTS COURT, DONALD TRUMP, AND OUR 
FAILING CONSTITUTION 173–86 (2017) (describing some of the pro-business decisions led by the 
conservative majority of the Roberts Court). 
 177. Peck, supra note 158, at xxx. 
 178. See Keren, supra note 157, at 864 (discussing neoliberalism treating emotions as a new 
type of personal property).  
 179. DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 10 (2011). 
 180. Interview by Ronald Butt with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, U.K., in London, 
U.K. (May 3, 1981). 
 181. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE & THE DISCOURSE ON 
LANGUAGE app. 215 (A. M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1972). 
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arbitration revolution offers a prime example. It demonstrates the 
takeover of a noneconomic arena by the metrics used initially only in 
market settings. Revolution aside, arbitration is one of several methods 
of alternative dispute resolution, all operating alongside conventional 
litigation. As such, arbitration is part of a civilized justice system 
maintained by society to avoid violent settlement of disagreements. 
Nonetheless, when the revolution commenced, it reconfigured arbitration 
as purely “a matter of contract,”182 thereby concealing its essence as an 
institutionalized form of dispute resolution. To further distance 
arbitration from justice, the new cases emphasized that arbitrations 
should be evaluated by their ability to achieve the core market goal of 
economic efficiency. Moreover, as Justice Scalia repeatedly stated in 
Concepcion and Italian Colors, such economic efficiency is to be 
measured by conventional economic metrics such as “costs,” “savings,” 
and “speed.”183 Instead of the “costliness and delays of [public] 
litigation,”184 he stated, private arbitration is a “speedy resolution”185 that 
offers “greater efficiency” by “reducing the cost and increasing the speed 
of dispute resolution.”186 Indeed, by the time the decisions in Epic and 
Lamp Plus were written, all that their authors did was adopt Justice 
Scalia’s economized language as if it were the only way to discuss 
matters of arbitration. 
To be sure, some of the economic jargon cited above was used to 
discuss arbitrations before. The point is not the use of words with 
economic flavor but rather their careful “recycling” to attack collective 
actions. Words that were used to compare arbitration to traditional 
adjudication are now used differently: to distinguish types of arbitrations 
and to convey that while individual arbitrations are valuable, class 
arbitrations are harmful. Consider the use of the word “speed” as one 
example. Pre-revolution, the Court used the promptness of arbitrations in 
a noneconomic way, emphasizing it as a reason to prevent courts from 
acting in a manner that would slow down arbitration. The Court stated, 
for example, that the FAA reflects a “clear congressional purpose that the 
arbitration procedure . . . be speedy and not subject to delay and 
obstruction in the courts.”187 Used in this way, “speedy” is not an 
economic standard but an idea relating to the harmonization of different 
methods of dispute resolution. Post-revolution, however, speed is used to 
mark the economic value of individual arbitrations and to portray 
 
 182. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011). 
 183. Id. at 345, 350. 
 184. Id. at 345 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)). 
 185. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 239 (2013). 
 186. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 345, 348. 
 187. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (emphasis 
added).  
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collective arbitrations as lacking such value. For example, the Court 
cautioned that “with class arbitration ‘the virtues Congress originally saw 
in arbitration, its speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness, would be 
shorn away.’”188 The new economized discourse thus makes speed a 
reason to reject some arbitrations while preferring others, completely 
subjecting the domain of dispute resolutions to economic logic. 
Similarly, the constant use of the jargon of “incentives” further 
transforms the issue of arbitration into a purely economic one. For 
example, as an essential part of his legal reasoning, Justice Scalia stressed 
in Concepcion that allowing class arbitrations “will have a substantial 
deterrent effect on incentives to arbitrate.”189 Later, in Italian Colors, he 
similarly translated the justice-based argument that collective action 
waivers leave claimants without redress into the language of economics. 
Under such treatment, claimants’ insistence on class arbitrations is 
explained not by the fact that without them they lose access to justice,190 
but merely by the economic problem of having “no economic incentive” 
to pursue claims individually.191 
In short, a new discourse has been born, subjecting a noneconomic 
setting to market rationality. By heavily using an economized rhetoric, 
applying a cost-and-benefit analysis, and committing to incentive 
thinking, the new arbitration jurisprudence amounts to the production of 
what sociologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu called a “strong 
discourse.”192 Similar to other neoliberal economization processes, the 
one transforming the domain of dispute resolution is implemented by 
“extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, and 
metrics”193 to a noneconomic issue. 
Suppressing any appeal to justice-based arguments completes the 
takeover of the field of arbitration by an economized rationality. A salient 
part of the arbitration revolution targets any attempt of arbitrators, state 
courts, agencies, or the liberal Justices to discuss the issue in 
noneconomic terms such as fairness and public policy. The revolution’s 
cases offer abundant examples of such negation of any alternative 
rationality—as if they follow Margret Thatcher’s “there is no alternative” 
 
 188. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019) (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. 
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018)). 
 189. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351 n.8. 
 190. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in 
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 782 (2002) (describing arbitration as the “denial of 
access . . . to the law itself”). 
 191. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013). 
 192. Pierre Bourdieu, Utopia of Endless Exploitation: The Essence of Neoliberalism, LE 
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Dec. 1998), http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu [https://perma 
.cc/65E6-7VG2] (“Neoliberal discourse is not just one discourse among many. Rather, it is a 
‘strong discourse.’”). 
 193. BROWN, supra note 34, at 30. 
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slogan, also called the “TINA-Principle.”194 When the dissent in 
Concepcion raised the issue that forbidding class proceedings denies 
access to justice, the response dismissed such thinking, claiming that 
states cannot require preserving class arbitrations, “even if it is desirable 
for unrelated reasons.”195 Similarly, in Italian Colors, the Court declared 
that an approach that insisted on the public policy underlying antitrust 
laws was “simply irrational.”196 And, in Epic, the majority repeated the 
general rejection of justice concerns, stating that in expressing concerns 
for workers’ ability to enforce wage-and-hour laws, “the dissent retreats 
to policy arguments” that courts are “not free” to make.197 The messages 
in all these examples go beyond applying an economic discourse to a 
noneconomic topic: together, they confront the legitimacy of arguments 
regarding justice, fairness, and public policy—once at the heart of legal 
debates regarding alternative dispute resolutions. 
The dismissal of any reasoning that deviates from market logic is a 
signature move of the neoliberal project. Following cultural critic Henry 
Giroux it is dubbed the “disimagination machine”198: the apparatus 
neoliberalism uses to gain hegemony and stifle resistance by making all 
alternative worldviews unimaginable.199 In the context of the arbitration 
debate, the alleged exclusivity of the economized discourse is directly 
aimed at the disimagination of the possibility of collectivism. Because 
according to economized logic class arbitrations do not make sense, and 
because no other analysis of the issue is considered legitimate, the 
capacity of individuals to resist corporate wrongdoing by coming 
together is “disimagined,” making class arbitration inconceivable. But 
there is more. As the following section discusses, neoliberal strategies 
have been used not only to differentiate class arbitrations from individual 
arbitrations based on economic logic but also to demonize them.   
C.  The Neoliberal Road to Separation200 
The decisions that constitute the revolution include strong rhetoric 
against class arbitrations. The assault starts by portraying these 
arbitrations as inferior according to market rationality: both “slower” and 
 
 194. Christian Neuhäuser, TINA, KRISIS, no. 2, 2018, at 15. 
 195. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 196. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 234. 
 197. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018). 
 198. HENRY A. GIROUX, THE VIOLENCE OF ORGANIZED FORGETTING: THINKING BEYOND 
AMERICA’S DISIMAGINATION MACHINE 26–27 (2014). 
 199. WILSON, supra note 173, at 72. 
 200. The title of this section alludes to Friedrich Hayek’s famous book, The Road to Serfdom, 
originally written in German and considered to be the fundamental text of the neoliberal project. 
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
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“more costly” than individual arbitrations.201 From there, it continues to 
presenting doubt regarding the authenticity and integrity of class 
arbitrations, describing them as “manufactured,” first in Concepcion202 
and most recently in Lamps Plus.203 And it gets harsher.  The revolution’s 
cases also portray class arbitrations as dangerous. In Italian Colors, the 
Court cautioned that if courts were obligated to ensure that a singular 
resolution is a viable option as a condition to enforcing a class arbitration 
waiver, the result would be a “litigating hurdle,”204 which “would 
undoubtedly destroy the prospect of a speedy resolution.”205 Even more 
belligerent is the deliberate effort to associate collectivity with the specter 
of chaos. Allowing class arbitrations, wrote Justice Scalia in Concepcion 
for the first time, is “likely to generate procedural morass.”206 Then, 
proving that he intentionally used this strong rhetoric, he repeated the 
exact sentence in Italian Colors.207 Next, to further spread the 
pronounced disdain towards class arbitration, both Justice Gorsuch in 
Epic and Chief Justice Roberts in Lamps Plus repeatedly emphasized the 
same threat of morass.208 Together, the cases that regularly identify class 
arbitrations with the specter “morass” follow the neoliberal method of 
turning anything that contributes to the public good into “a metaphor for 
public disorder.”209 One can only hypothesize that Justice Scalia designed 
the legal phrase “[p]rocedural morass” to echo the neoliberal attack on 
the welfare state, which has been constantly presented as creating a 
“bureaucratic morass.”210  
Furthermore, revealing much of neoliberalism’s relentless loyalty to 
corporations, the revolution’s decisions further demonize class 
arbitrations by describing them as intentionally harming the corporations 
that are their typical defendants. Class arbitrations are portrayed, for 
example, as a tool utilized to bully corporations “into settling 
questionable claims,”211 one that “unfairly ‘plac[es] pressure on the 
 
 201. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011); see also Lamps 
Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019) (describing class arbitration by quoting 
Concepcion); Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1623 (same); Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 238 (same).  
 202. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348. 
 203. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417–18 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348). 
 204. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 238–39 (emphasis added). 
 205. Id. (emphasis added). 
 206. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added). 
 207. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 238 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348). 
 208. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
at 348); Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348). 
 209. Henry A. Giroux, Neoliberalism, Corporate Culture, and the Promise of Higher 
Education: The University as a Democratic Public Sphere, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 425, 428 (2002).  
 210. DONNCHA MARRON, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 91 (2009). 
 211. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350. 
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defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims,’”212 while exposing them 
to “the risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements.”213 However, given corporations’ 
significant power advantage, this description of victimhood rings hollow 
and can be seen only as part of a robust anti-collective message. 
Significantly, this fierce attack on class arbitrations is tightly linked to 
and serves as a leading illustration of neoliberalism’s general assault on 
anything collective.214 Awareness of this linkage is critical to developing 
a deeper understanding of the roots and real purpose of the revolution. To 
neoliberals, all acts of solidarity that can challenge the existing structure 
of power are unwelcome. Under neoliberalism, individuals should remain 
strictly focused on increasing their personal human capital, and thus, 
“they are not supposed to choose to construct strong collective 
institutions.”215 Indeed, as Bourdieu theorized, in its essence, 
neoliberalism is “a programme of the methodological destruction of 
collectives.”216 
But why do neoliberals so strongly object to individuals’ efforts to 
cooperate? One evident reason is neoliberalism’s aspiration to total 
hegemony. As part of imposing market rationality everywhere, 
neoliberals are highly committed to preserving and enhancing the current 
control of the strongest market actors. Accordingly, they are also 
committed to blocking any resistance by collectives of ordinary citizens, 
such as consumers or employees. From this perspective, a neoliberal 
worldview dictates supporting the efforts of corporations to insulate 
themselves from demanding legal confrontations that carry significant 
economic and reputational risks. 
And yet, to more fully understand the resistance to collectivity, one 
needs to go deeper and interrogate the intellectual roots of neoliberalism 
and the way they have shaped influential neoliberal strategies that can 
shed light on the success of the arbitration. In her thorough study of the 
archives of one of the leading thinkers of neoliberalism, the late Nobel 
Laureate James Buchanan, historian Nancy MacLean recently offered an 
original explanation that goes to the theoretical origins of American 
neoliberalism. In general, her book, titled Democracy In Chains, details 
the centrality of Buchanan’s work to the project of transferring to the 
United States the original of neoliberal ideas,217 which emerged in the 
famous gathering in Mont Pelerin and were articulated in the writings of 
 
 212. Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., PA v. Allstate Ins., 
559 U.S. 393, 445 n.3 (2010)). 
 213. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350. 
 214. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 34, at 153; WILSON, supra note 173, at 5.  
 215. See HARVEY, supra note 175, at 69.  
 216. Bourdieu, supra note 192 (emphasis omitted).  
 217. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at xviii (arguing that the Buchanan’s lifetime work played 
a major role in saving neoliberal ideas from remaining a “dead-end fantasy”).  
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economist Friedrich Hayek.218 Aptly, Buchanan even referred to himself 
as the “American ‘Hayek.’”219  
Of particular relevance to the neoliberal assault on collectivity, 
MacLean’s study exposes that neoliberal intellectuals often used the 
phrase “the collective order” as a cipher for the enemy of their goals.220 
The phrase referred to the risky ability of individuals, who are powerless 
when separated, to band together and make demands for legal and policy 
reforms that government officials would accept due to the strength of 
numbers.221 The “collective order” is perilous because to satisfy the needs 
of the many would necessarily require the fewer wealthy to participate in 
funding the efforts while sacrificing their interests. 
Accordingly, in 1956, when the University of Virginia asked him to 
chair its economic department and to found and lead the Thomas 
Jefferson Center for Political Economy and Social Philosophy, Buchanan 
suggested a mission statement that clarified that the new center would 
exclude those who seem to support “the coercive powers of the collective 
order.”222 He also later explained that the new center would aim to break 
“the powerful grip that collectivist ideology already had on the minds of 
intellectuals.”223 
MacLean’s analysis suggests that what lies at the core of the neoliberal 
hostility to collective group action is fear of “the American people 
collectively.”224 In a defensive response, therefore, the neoliberal plan has 
been for many years to delegitimize and defeat collective acts. 
Buchanan’s famous and highly influential public choice theory, for which 
he was awarded the Nobel Prize in economic sciences in 1986, offers a 
leading example of the intellectual effort to minimize the threat of group 
action. One of the theory’s central innovations was a negative exposition 
of the very attempt of collectives to pursue their interests, a dynamic that 
the theory marked inadequate, not least by giving it a new name with a 
flavor of manipulation and greed: “rent seeking.”225 The fact that the 
public choice theory was presented and accepted as a groundbreaking 
academic work, as opposed to an ideological argument, helped to make 
it influential outside of economics departments, with a particular sway on 
 
 218. See DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE 
BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 2–3 (2012).  
 219. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 137. 
 220. Id. at xxiii. 
 221. See id. at xxii. 
 222. Id. at 45 (quoting the private mission statement submitted by Buchanan).  
 223. Id. at 46 (quoting the private mission statement submitted by Buchanan).  
 224. Id. at 10. 
 225. See AMADAE, supra note 161, at 270 (explaining rent-seeking); see also Sophie Harnay 
& Alain Marciano, Seeking Rents Through Class Actions and Legislative Lobbying: A 
Comparison, 32 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 293, 300–02 (2011) (discussing the consequences for rent-
seeking strategies).  
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legal analysis, mainly through the theory’s adoption by the increasingly 
dominant law and economics movement.226 The rational choice theory 
and the related game theory have similarly helped to shape anti-collective 
views in many disciplines. As political scientist S. M. Amadae argues in 
her book Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political 
Economy, “collective action, public interest, voluntary cooperation, 
trades unions, social solidarity, and even voting are all irrational 
according to rational choice theory.”227  
Importantly, resistance to collectivity has not remained academic. 
Theories such as the public choice theory and the rational choice theory 
have had an immense impact in the real world, and their message that 
collective action is “inefficient” and “manipulative” eventually found its 
way to the Supreme Court and helped to bring about the arbitration 
revolution. Salient facilitators of the flow of ideas from universities to 
courts have been generous funding and massive organization-building 
activity by the financial elite that lead America’s largest corporations 
with the leading example of the billionaire brothers David and Charles 
Koch. Sharing Buchanan’s concerns regarding “the collective order,” but 
understanding the limits of their direct political power under a democratic 
majority system,228 the Koch brothers have spent decades “funding 
conservative economists and law professors, think tanks, and political 
groups.”229 In doing so, they seem to have followed Buchanan’s 
important strategy that called for paying “attention to the rules rather than 
the rulers.”230 In MacLean’s words:  
Only James Buchanan had also developed an operational 
strategy for how to get to that radically new society, one that 
took as axiomatic what both Buchanan and Koch understood 
viscerally: that the enduring impediment to the enactment of 
their political vision was the ability of the American people, 
through the power of their numbers, to reject the program.231  
Additionally, and as part of paying attention to the “rules,” the Koch 
brothers have also supported the advancement of Buchanan-like ideas 
through educating and training future rulemakers—from law students, 
through lawyers, to judges—and helping them secure influential 
 
 226. See TELES, supra note 166, at 121. 
 227. AMADAE, supra note 161, at 9–10.  
 228. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 193. 
 229. Alex Kotch, US Treasury Cites Koch-Funded Research in Critique of Consumer 
Protections, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.ibtimes.com/political-
capital/us-treasury-cites-koch-funded-research-critique-consumer-protections-2607138 
[https://perma.cc/7SGQ-2FQL]. 
 230. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 184. 
 231. Id. at 193. 
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positions.232 While this space is too limited to describe the many ways in 
which interested economic elites promote neoliberal ideas through law,233 
one example that particularly relates to the battle against collective 
actions and the arbitration revolution is worth highlighting. It shows that 
the hostility to collective actions expressed in the leading cases of the 
revolution is part of a concerted and well-planned effort to defeat 
collective actions by a combination of theory, money, and law. 
The Justices who wrote the revolution’s leading cases—Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Alito, and Justice Gorsuch—had 
significant exposure to the aversion towards collectivity, and their 
familiarity with the issue was not coincidental but a product of deliberate 
efforts. We already have seen that the Justices have long been connected 
with the Federalist Society.234 What needs to be added here, to illustrate 
the pathways from theory to legal change further, is the issue of funding. 
To disseminate Buchanan-like approaches in a manner that can reach the 
rulemakers, the Koch brothers have offered direct and significant 
financial support to the Federalist Society, sponsoring the Society’s 
efforts to organize gatherings in which market-based ideas would be 
exchanged and to promote committed participants to the judiciary.235 In 
addition, to stretch their worldview to the bench, the Koch brothers also 
established their complex network of organizations and centers—
sometimes referred to as “Kochtopus”236 or “Kochland.”237 This network 
has offered members of the judiciary, including the abovementioned 
Supreme Court Justices, many opportunities to closely interact with 
theorists and business moguls in summer training sessions, seminars, 
fundraising events, and more.238  
For example, in 2007, Justice Scalia took part in a “‘political strategy 
and fund-raising’ seminar” organized by the Koch brothers while the 
Federalist Society reimbursed all his expenses.239 The ethical aspects of 
such participation attracted some criticism,240 but for the current 
discussion, what matters more is mapping out how the goal of shielding 
corporations from collective challenges might have made its way from 
 
 232. See id. at 195. 
 233. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 34, at 151–73. 
 234. See supra Part II. 
 235. MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: HOW 
CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM LIBERALS 17 tbl.3 (2013) (listing the Koch family, 
via different foundations, amongst the leading contributors to the society).  
 236. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 189. 
 237. CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, KOCHLAND: THE SECRET HISTORY OF KOCH INDUSTRIES AND 
CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA (2019). 
 238. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 195 (“[A] stunning 40 percent of the U.S. federal judiciary 
had been treated to a Koch-backed curriculum.”). 
 239. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 426 (2014). 
 240. See id. at 426–27.  
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theory to revolution. On the same point, Buchanan’s involvement with 
George Mason University (GMU) in general, and the history of the birth 
and rise of GMU’s law school in particular, both offer another 
illuminating example that ties together theory (Buchanan), funding 
(Koch), and law (Justice Scalia). In the 1980s, after Buchanan joined 
GMU’s economics department and brought with him the Center for the 
Study of Public Choice,241 his presence came with “[l]iterally millions of 
dollars.”242 Subsequent to Buchanan’s move to GMU, Charles Koch had 
the Institute for Humane Studies, which he controlled, follow.243 Soon 
after, the head of the institute invited Buchanan to speak at the national 
conference of the Federalist Society and although it is not clear whether 
he accepted the invite, his theories were discussed many times during the 
Society’s gatherings, where, as referenced earlier, the Justices leading the 
revolution, and especially Justice Scalia, were sometimes in 
attendance.244 
The Koch family continued to support spreading Buchanan anti-
collective ideas. In 1997, for example, it donated ten million dollars to 
the creation of the new and enlarged James Buchanan Center for Political 
Economy, explaining to a forum of research fellows that achieving 
reforms while being “greatly outnumbered” by the majority of citizens 
requires developing “winning strategies.”245 Similarly, in 2016, the 
Charles Koch Foundation added another ten million dollars to support 
renaming GMU’s law school, itself an establishment committed to 
conservative law and economics thinking.246 With the help of this 
donation, the law school that Henry Mann established then changed its 
name to the Antonin Scalia Law School.247 In its announcement of the 
name-change the school also reported that the Kochs’ contribution was 
supplemented by another gift of twenty million dollars from a donor who 
had contacted GMU via the executive vice president of the Federalist  
Society, Leonard Leo, whom the announcement described as “a personal 
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 242. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 172 (quoting then-senior vice president of George Mason 
University).  
 243. See Matthew Baraka, George Mason University Becomes a Favorite of Charles Koch, 
AP (Apr. 1, 2016), https://apnews.com/613470e79eb64a5f9a4880996e0fd7c5/george-mason-
university-becomes-favorite-charles-koch [https://perma.cc/B7WY-H7AP]. 
 244. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 245. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at xx, 242 n.13 (quoting Charles G. Koch, Address to a 
Fellows Research Colloquium: Creating a Science of Liberty (1997)). 
 246. For the history of the law school, and its importance in disseminating conservative 
ideology, see TELES, supra note 166, at 207–16. 
 247. See Mason Receives $30 Million in Gifts, Renames Law School After Justice Antonin 
Scalia, GEO. MASON U. (2016), https://www.law.gmu.edu/news/2016/scalia_school_of_law_ 
announcement [https://perma.cc/KBK7-V6HM]. 
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friend of the late Justice Scalia and his family.”248 Leonard Leo, others 
argued, is also the one who brought to the Supreme Court the other three 
Justices that have led the revolution, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito and Gorsuch.249 
While all the ties described above may amount only to a 
“circumstantial trail [that] leaves many open questions,” to use 
MacLean’s candid words,250 the point here is mainly to illustrate the 
purposeful investment in diffusing anti-collective theories and a pro-
corporate approach into the legal system, enough to empower the 
emergence of a new jurisprudence that would eliminate the ability of 
individuals to band together against corporations. 
Much more directly, stalwarts of the Koch-supported Federalist 
Society openly sought to bring the revolution about via a variety of 
amicus briefs. Prior to the historic decision in Concepcion, for example, 
members of the Society were involved in filing four different amicus 
briefs calling for an unlimited affirmation of collective action waivers: 
on behalf of the Class Action Fairness Center, the Wireless Association, 
The Voice of the Defense Bar, and by a group of “Distinguished Law 
Professors.”251 Indeed, in an analysis of Concepcion published in the 
Federalist Society’s journal, titled Class Action Watch, Professor Brian 
Fitzpatrick—to whom the Society awarded in the same year its lucrative 
Bator award252—opined that “the Supreme Court has just handed the 
business community its biggest victory in a very long time.”253 
Fitzpatrick additionally predicted that “the decision could lead to the end 
of class actions against businesses across most—if not all—of their 
activities.”254 And, as subsequent cases of the revolution prove, he was 
right. Years of writing, educating, funding, and organizing eventually 
succeeded, awarding corporations a weapon against the loathed 
“collective order.” 
To summarize this detailed section, it is therefore possible to sketch 
in broad strokes the path from the development of neoliberal ideas in the 
United States to the most recent decision of the arbitration revolution. In 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Terry Gross, How One Man Brought Justices Roberts, Alito, and Gorsuch to the 
Supreme Court, NPR (Apr. 12, 2017, 1:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/12/523495201/ 
how-one-man-brought-justices-roberts-alito-and-gorsuch-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc 
/XR24-YJHH] (interviewing Jeffrey Toobin, a staff writer at The New Yorker). 
 250. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 297 n.72. 
 251. AVERY & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 235, at 93, 94. 
 252. Brian Fitzpatrick Receives the Federalist Society’s 2011 Bator Award, VAND. U. (Mar. 
7, 2011), https://law.vanderbilt.edu/news/brian-fitzpatrick-receives-the-federalist-societys-2011-
bator-award/ [https://perma.cc/U94S-X24G]. 
 253. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Did the Supreme Court Just Kill the Class Action?, CLASS ACTION 
WATCH, Sept. 2011, at 1, 12.  
 254. Id. at 1. 
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the beginning, theories were developed and spread to convey that 
collective actions are irrational, coercive, and dangerous. Then, 
corporations started to use their market power, as well as market tools 
(contracts), to eliminate collective actions. Next, after some years of legal 
battles, the law was dramatically changed, compelling courts to enforce 
those restrictive contracts, regardless of their impact on access to justice. 
And most recently, it was decided that even corporations that did not try 
to prevent collective actions explicitly will be helped by the Court that 
made sure that from now on, judges and arbitrators will give arbitration 
clauses in standard contracts an interpretation that disallows group-
action. Significantly, the leaders of the largest American corporations 
have carefully planned and generously funded all of the four stops along 
the road to separation. Overall, by actively helping corporations to isolate 
people, the majority of the Supreme Court added legal authority to a pro-
corporation and anti-collective neoliberal ideology, further legitimizing 
its rationality and amplifying its already immense impact. 
As if predicting all that, geographer David Harvey wrote in 2005 that 
“the neoliberal state is necessarily hostile to all forms of social solidarity 
that put restraints on capital accumulation.”255 He further explained that, 
if need be, the state will use its legal arm against collectives, resorting “to 
coercive legislation and policing tactics . . . to disperse or repress 
collective forms of opposition to corporate power.”256 The more profound 
investigation of the theoretical roots of resisting collective actions 
combined with the sketching of how those ideas were deliberately 
diffused into the Supreme Court perfectly matches Harvey’s description: 
the arbitration revolution indeed has operated to “repress collective forms 
of opposition to corporate power.” The coming Part asks: Repression at 
what price? 
III.  GENERATING AFFECTIVE POWERLESSNESS 
As others have argued before,257 and I have written elsewhere,258 the 
arbitration revolution and the increasing ability of corporations to 
immunize themselves from liability that it fostered have many negative 
 
 255. HARVEY, supra note 175, at 75. Note that here again neoliberalism greatly differs from 
liberalism, especially the Rawlsian type of liberalism, which would have supported collective 
actions to promote individual interests, particularly when individual autonomy is at risk due to 
inequalities. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753, 764–79 (2007) (discussing the different theories that are relevant to the 
class action debate).  
 256. HARVEY, supra note 175, at 77. 
 257. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 25, at 3054, 3057.  
 258. See Hila Keren, Undermining Justice: The Two Rises of Freedom of Contract and the 
Fall of Equity, 2 CANADIAN J. COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 339, 345 (2016). 
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consequences. Those include a severe decrease in access to justice,259 
weakening of both the common law260 and essential federal laws that rely 
on private civil litigation,261 and, due to the accumulation of all of the 
previous concerns, general harm to equality and the rule of law.262 
However, recognizing the role of neoliberalism in shaping the anti-
collectivist core of the revolution allows identifying additional damage: 
a pervasive emotionally corrosive effect that carries with it a long-term 
social risk. 
To those interested in studying the impact of neoliberalism, these yet-
to-be-noticed consequences—which arise outside of the conventional 
domains of law and economics—will not come as a surprise. After all, as 
mentioned earlier, Margaret Thatcher famously announced that the goal 
of disseminating neoliberal ideas has always been “to change the soul.”263 
Moreover, critics of neoliberalism have long been cautioning that the 
neoliberal takeover includes significant and intentional influence on the 
emotions and that such control hurts our sociality.264 
As argued in the previous Parts, the arbitration revolution has created 
a separation process that has been inspired by neoliberal theorists, 
executed and funded by organized corporate leaders, and embraced by 
the Supreme Court. This Part cautions that this separation process has a 
penetrating effect on the soul. It leaves people isolated from their peers 
and abandoned by their state. All alone, ordinary citizens are being put 
into a long-term condition of feeling powerless and helpless, too 
weakened to engage in resistance. The fact that such powerlessness 
perfectly aligns with the neoliberal goal of reaching hegemony suggests 
that the emotional consequences are far from accidental. 
A.  Individualized Arbitrations and Neoliberal Individualization 
Decades of organized pressure to defeat collective actions, both in 
judicial and arbitral forums, have left people like Frank Varela with only 
one path of action: to pursue justice outside of courts and all alone. 
Intriguingly, while eradicating all other options, the decisions that 
constitute the revolution reformed even the name of this surviving option. 
In the middle of the revolution, after Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion, and 
 
 259. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes 
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012).  
 260. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 25, at 377 (“For the entire categories of cases that are 
ushered into [arbitration] . . . common law doctrinal development will cease.”). 
 261. See, e.g., David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 989 (2017) 
(explaining “how arbitration affects the implementation of statutes that are enforced through 
private civil litigation”). 
 262. See, e.g., Keren, supra note 258, at 395.  
 263. Interview by Ronald Butt with Margaret Thatcher, supra note 180. 
 264. See, e.g., Keren, supra note 157, at 871–74 (explaining how the impact of neoliberalism 
in the affective arena threatens to fray our social fabric). 
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Italian Colors, the Court drifted away from the tradition of calling a non-
class arbitration a “bilateral” arbitration.265 Instead—and for the first time 
at the Supreme Court level—Justice Gorsuch introduced in Epic a new 
designation, repeatedly referring to a non-class arbitration as an 
“individualized” arbitration.266 Shortly after, Chief Justice Roberts 
adopted this new labeling in the recent Lamp Plus, as well as other judges 
and scholars who wrote about the topic post-Epic.267 
Like Shakespeare’s Juliet, one may ask: “[W]hat’s in a name?”268 To 
which at least two replies are due, both relying on the broad recognition 
of the expressive power of law.269 The first relates to the comparison 
between using “bilateral” and “individualized” to describe the only 
option left post-revolution. The adjective “bilateral,” which literally 
means two-sided,270 also denotes, when used in the context of arbitration, 
a dispute resolution process that is mutual, reciprocal, and consensual.271 
The use of “bilateral” thus encourages associating the path to redress that 
it describes with fundamental principles of justice. At the same time, 
“bilateral” also helps to conceal the typical gap of power between the 
parties to the standard contracts that forbid collective action, a gap that 
so clearly existed in cases like Concepcion and Italian Colors. For those 
reasons, using “bilateral” was a convenient linguistic choice for Justice 
Scalia, as he introduced for the first time a revolution that closes options 
 
 265. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 338, 347–48 (2011) (using 
the word “bilateral” six times to refer to non-class arbitration). 
 266. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619–23, 1626, 1629, 1632 (2018) 
(describing this path of arbitration/proceedings/dispute resolution procedure as “individualized” 
fifteen times). 
 267. Until Epic, no decision of the Supreme Court used the term “individualized arbitration.” 
The term appeared in lower courts for the first time in 1997. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. 
Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1424 (M.D. Ala. 1997), rev’d, 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), and 
aff’d, 244 F.3d 814 (2001). Based on a Lexis-Advanced search, from that time and until 5/21/2018 
(the date of the Court’s decision in Epic), for more than two decades, the term was used by lower 
courts thirty-seven times. Then, in the short time post-Epic and until 8/19/2019 the term was used 
in the Court’s decision in Lamp Plus as well as in additional forty-two decisions of lower courts. 
This rapidly increasing frequency offers another demonstration of legal dissemination of 
neoliberal logic.  
 268. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2 (arguing that the fact that 
Romeo’s last name associates him with a rival family should not matter because “[t]hat which we 
call a rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet”). 
 269. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 607–
08 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 
1650–51 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2022 (1996). 
 270. Bilateral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bilateral. 
[https://perma.cc/7VA4-CUX8]. 
 271. All synonyms suggested by the web and Microsoft Word versions of thesauri, 
respectively. For the online version, see Bilateral, THESAURUS.COM, https://www.thesaurus.com/ 
browse/bilateral?s=t [https://perma.cc/5S3C-LHSQ]. 
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formerly open for all. Moreover, and related to the previous Part, such 
rhetoric illustrates the stealth “winning strategies” that Buchanan 
recommended and Koch institutionalized.272 Conversely, substituting 
“bilateral” with “individualized” has none of the above strategic 
advantages as the latter word highlights rather than obscures the solitude 
that is inherent to the non-collective path to redress. 
The second reply relates to the difference between describing the 
single remaining way to seek justice as “individualized” and not merely 
(as numerous courts have done) as “individual.”273 Interestingly, Justice 
Gorsuch added the adjective “individualized” to the discussion in Epic 
after the lower court that decided the dispute, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, limited itself to the language of “individual” 
arbitration.274 The increasing use of the word “individualized” is a 
particularly meaningful rhetorical choice in light of the neoliberal 
background of the revolution. It is similarly crucial if one wishes to better 
understand how the legal change operates to further disseminate the 
neoliberal common sense. 
Most generally, breaking social life into individualized segments is a 
core idea in neoliberalism. As political scientist Wendy Brown explained, 
neoliberalism “solicits the individual as the only relevant and wholly 
accountable actor.”275 The goal of neoliberal individualization is not only 
to separate people from each other out of the aversion to collectives 
mentioned before. It is also to draw a clear dividing line between the self 
and its environment, disconnecting people and their experiences from any 
social context. In this way, neoliberalism suppresses individuals’ ability 
to link their fate to the social order or to implore assistance from social 
institutions or the state. It makes, in short, “[s]elf and society . . . mutually 
exclusive,”276 echoing Margaret Thatcher’s infamous declaration that 
there is no justification for government help because “[t]here is no such 
thing as society.”277 
It is worth recognizing here that neoliberal individualization is 
markedly different from liberal individualism. Individualism emerges 
from a celebration of individuality that is associated with agency and 
autonomy, and it leaves each person to self-determine her needs and 
goals. By contrast, individualization is an imposed process that ignores 
 
 272. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at xx. 
 273. While many lower courts have exclusively used “individual” rather than “bilateral” or 
“individualized,” none of the revolution cases have done that. E.g., Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 274. Id.   
 275. BROWN, supra note 34, at 133. 
 276. WILSON, supra note 173, at 4.  
 277. Interview by Douglas Keay with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, U.K., in London, 
U.K. (Sept. 23, 1987), https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689 [https://perma.cc 
/US6Y-FKCM]. 
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private inclinations and wishes and generally cares very little about the 
individual herself. An important part of the individualization process is 
the way neoliberal rationality interrupts autonomy, dictating to all people 
that their primary goal, as they approach any area of their life, should be 
to maximize their human capital.278 The purpose of such a self-
optimization project is to endlessly attempt to win what neoliberalism 
frames as an ongoing competition against other individuals over scarce 
resources.279 Individualization also denies the universal vulnerabilities 
that make us inevitably interdependent while rendering irrational the 
natural yearning for giving and receiving (free) care.280 
Accordingly, when Justice Gorsuch repeatedly used the word 
“individualized” he revealed that even when they are included in signed 
contracts, collective action waivers may not truly be mutual and 
consensual (as suggested by “bilateral”) or the product of individual 
choice (as indicated by “individual”). Instead, what comes to the fore 
thanks to Justice Gorsuch’s new articulation is the forced and involuntary 
nature of the process that pressures claimant to battle wrongdoing all by 
themselves. Similarly, when Chief Justice Roberts followed Justice 
Gorsuch’s discourse in Lamps Plus, he brought to light the fact that even 
when arbitration clauses do not include waivers, courts nonetheless are 
going to compel claimants to fight alone by reading these clauses as if 
they were limiting collective action. To call the resulting narrow path of 
access to justice “individualized arbitration” is, therefore, to concede that 
“individualization is a fate, not a choice.”281 
It is certainly possible that neither Justice Gorsuch nor Chief Justice 
Roberts was aware of the critical analyses of the neoliberal “relentless 
process of individualization,”282 as they each shifted to using the 
language of “individualized” arbitration. They surely did not adopt this 
new phrasing with out of a wish to expose the forced nature of the single 
path they have left open for claimants. However, at the same time, the 
ease with which the word “individualized” entered the conversation 
despite its nonconsensual tone can teach us something about how far 
along the revolution had already been by the time the decisions in Epic 
and Lamps Plus were written. It suggests that by 2018, seven years post-
Concepcion, and after the election of President Donald Trump resulted in 
a conservative control of the Court, the Justices felt confident enough to 
forego previous efforts to “market” individual arbitration as something 
that, from claimants’ perspective, might be favorable or at least fair. 
 
 278. BROWN, supra note 34, at 31–32, 34. 
 279. SAM BINKLEY, HAPPINESS AS ENTERPRISE: AN ESSAY ON NEOLIBERAL LIFE 23 (2014). 
 280. WILSON, supra note 173, at 5. 
 281. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID MODERNITY 34 (2000). 
 282. Mark Davis & Zygmunt Bauman, FREEDOM AND CONSUMERISM: A CRITIQUE OF 
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN LIQUID MODERNITY 93 (2008).  
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Moreover, in both Epic and Lamps Plus, the Justices not only 
described the claimants as subject to an “individualized” process, but they 
also adopted another signature move of neoliberalism and 
“responsibilized” these claimants, holding them solely and entirely 
responsible to their fate.283 First in Epic and then in Lamp Plus, the 
individualized employees were further framed as the only ones 
responsible for being left without an effective path of redress simply 
because they “agreed” to arbitrate. For example, in Epic, Justice Gorsuch 
went as far as blaming the individual employee, Mr. Morris, for daring to 
sue Ernest and Young “despite having agreed to arbitrate claims against 
the firm.”284 In a similar tone, Chief Justice Roberts stated in his 
description of the facts in Lamp Plus that “[l]ike most Lamps Plus 
employees, Varela had signed an arbitration agreement when he started 
work at the company. But after the data breach, he sued Lamps 
Plus . . . .”285 It appears that because both Justices had already conceded 
that the employees were limited to an “individualized” arbitration they 
had no particular need to cope with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that in both 
cases tried to remind everyone that the employees had not truly agreed to 
anything but rather had faced a “Hobson’s choice” to “accept arbitration 
on their employer’s terms or give up their jobs.”286 
And yet, even if the adoption of the “individualized” modifier was not 
aimed at illuminating the true nature of non-class arbitration, its 
appearance can help seeing that by using the power of the legal system, 
neoliberalism individualizes even the ways humans cope with inevitable 
crises in their lives, such as the scams that harmed the employees in both 
Epic and Lamp Plus. Limited to “individualized” solutions, each person 
learns that when in trouble, she cannot count on anyone but herself. 
Ironically, the discussion above shows that as part of the neoliberal 
project, corporations and the Court have acted together in the last few 
decades to create a world defined by intense separation and isolation. 
What are the consequences of living in such a world?  
B.  The Emotional Consequences of Individualization 
Importantly, neoliberalism is not only a top-down project led by 
corporations and their avid supporters. Much of its success to reach 
people of all political persuasions relates to the fact that we have all 
internalized the neoliberal logic until it feels our own, sometimes without 
 
 283. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 34, at 133 (explaining how people are being 
“responsibilized” because neoliberalism, for its own political goals, “solicits the individual as the 
only relevant and wholly accountable actor”).  
 284. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1620 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 285. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1413 (2019) (emphasis added). 
 286. Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1636 n.2; Lamp Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1421 (quoting Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 
1636 n.2). 
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even having full awareness of its origins. This internalization process is 
itself a product of a neoliberal strategy. As sociologist Sam Binkley 
explains it: “Preferring not to act on subjects directly” and seeking to 
“govern minimally” the neoliberal project “brings about specific changes 
in its subjects. . . . ”287 To use only one simple example, many think and 
say that they need to “invest” more time in themselves, their health, or 
their relationship with others, accepting the economic dynamics of 
calculating investments and returns without noticing the structural 
limitations on their time (such as due to having to work for long hours).288 
Some even invest actual money in measuring and ranking their 
performance in these noneconomic spheres, using a rapidly growing 
marketplace of products designed for such tasks.289 Through such an 
internalization process, the neoliberal worldview disseminates itself by 
working from within.290 
Eventually, coming at us from many external sources and springing 
internally, the neoliberal message ends up influencing everything in our 
lives, including not only well-calculated big decisions such as what to 
study and where, but also, for example, the way we express ourselves. A 
particularly relevant example is found in longitudinal studies of written 
texts in the United States and Norway that demonstrate how with the rise 
of neoliberalism during the last few decades the frequency of words 
related to collective solidarity (e.g. “obliged” or “common”) decreased, 
while the frequency of words pertaining to individual self-promotion 
(e.g., “choose” or “entitlement”) increased.291 Importantly, with this 
penetrating power neoliberalism also influences our emotional life. 
Accordingly, this section argues that the inability to seek justice 
together with others either in courts or in arbitration creates a severe sense 
of isolation that produces intense feelings of powerlessness and 
helplessness. Such lasting emotions are individually and socially harmful 
much beyond the arbitration-controlled contractual arena: they deplete 
individual and social resilience in all areas of life and stand to produce 
despair and apathy that would further enhance the general social 
disconnect produced by neoliberalism.292 
 
 287. Sam Binkley, The Emotional Logic of Neoliberalism: Reflexivity and Instrumentality in 
Three Theoretical Traditions, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 158, at 589 
(emphasis added). 
 288. See Keren, supra note 157, at 866.  
 289. See generally id. at 864–71 (describing how neoliberalism has changed the 
conceptualization of emotions).   
 290. Id. at 866.  
 291. Glenn Adams et al., The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of 
Psychology, 75 J. SOC. ISSUES 189, 194 (2019). 
 292. WILSON, supra note 173, at 153 (“[L]iving in [neoliberal] competition breeds social 
alienation and disconnection at both the individual and social level.”). 
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Illuminating the emotional consequences of ousting collective actions 
and leaving people to fend for themselves is an intricate task. Part of the 
complexity is that this separation project has culminated, as we have seen, 
only recently and in an intentional and stealthy way, which makes 
evidence scant. Another complication comes from the general inclination 
to ignore the emotions when analyzing legal issues.293 As a result, despite 
the richness of scholarly work studying and criticizing the arbitration 
revolution, no attention was given to the possibility that it has a long-term 
impact on people’s emotions. 
And yet, a notable exception recently appeared in the context of 
employment contracts when an employee explicitly expressed in a 
published interview the emotional impact of being subject to a class 
action waiver. The interviewed employee stated: “The employment class 
action waiver affected me emotionally as I felt powerless in the 
organization. I felt isolated from others . . . .”294 This direct statement 
offers a critical starting point, and it indeed begins to substantiate the 
considerable emotional toll that the neoliberal attack imposes on 
collective actions. A 2017 psychological experiment provides further 
direct support, reporting that exposing people to information regarding 
the effect of arbitration clauses generated “negative feelings toward 
binding arbitration.”295 What follows is a detailed study of less direct 
evidence. The findings strongly support the above employee’s account 
and particularly demonstrate how denying access to collective legal 
actions can produce the powerlessness that the interviewed employee 
reported.  
1.  Reports by Class Action Participants 
People who did manage to get involved in class action have reported 
an array of positive emotions. Their reports strongly suggest that by 
banning class actions, corporations, and the courts that support them, 
deprive people of such valuable affective effects. The positive impact of 
engagement in class actions can be gleaned from a set of interviews 
conducted by Professor Stephen Meili with active representatives of class 
actions (often called “named plaintiffs”) and their lawyers. Building on 
previous work by Professor Bryant Garth,296 Meili’s interviews 
demonstrate a general “sense of empowerment” that comes from the 
 
 293. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. 
L. REV. 1997, 2034 (2010). 
 294. Matthew B. Seipel, The Strong Do as They Can: How Employment Group-Action 
Waivers Alienate Employees, 7 AM. U. LABOR & EMP. L.F. 1, 2 (2017) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting an unnamed Software Engineer). 
 295. Quintanilla & Avtgis, supra note 32, at 2128. 
 296. See Bryant G. Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class Action, 26 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 237, 237 (1992). 
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involvement in class actions.297 As part of such broad empowerment, 
interviewees reported feeling capable, worthy, influential, effective, and 
proud. For example, they felt that class actions gave them, despite being 
“little people,” the rare ability “to take on large corporate interests.”298 
Similarly, they described feeling “satisfied” because they had made a 
difference and had been successful in bringing about change.299 As one 
plaintiff said, “[T]he point was made . . . the next time around [debt 
collectors] will look more in depth at what they’re sending out . . . .”300  
Moreover, some interviewees have highlighted the potential of feeling 
self-validation by the process. To illustrate, one named plaintiff who 
expressed deep disappointment when “his” class action was not certified 
explained that certification would have meant that participants “could 
have been somebody.”301 Significantly, much of the empowerment-
related emotions were experienced in the face of a threat to resilience.  
Interviewees repeatedly contrasted their emerging positive feelings with 
being previously disempowered and disrespected by the corporations 
they took action against. They described how being part of a class action 
activity helped them survive humiliation and restore self-value after 
having been made to feel “insignificant”302 or even like “dirt.”303 Such a 
description illuminates how collective actions not only offer a practical 
solution to limited resources but also offer an essential emotional coping 
mechanism. 
Similarly, class actions function at the emotional level by offering a 
healthy mode of coping with anger and other intense negative emotions 
caused by the wrongdoing. For example, for several named plaintiffs the 
process allowed them to “air private grievances.”304 Likewise, one 
attorney reported that the procedure offered a method for plaintiffs “to do 
something” about feeling angry.305 In other words, participants found in 
class actions a way to “channel” anger into a much more productive 
path.306 Their experiences accord with other scholarly work of law and 
emotions theorists that more generally explained the way law could assist 
in positively channeling emotions, for example, in the context of 
 
 297. Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or Personal Gain? An Empirical Analysis of 
Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV. 67, 84 (2011).  
 298. Id. at 90. 
 299. See id. at 114–18. 
 300. Id. at 116. 
 301. Id. at 97 (quoting Telephone Interview 30043 (Sept. 30, 2009)). 
 302. Id. at 101 (“And they don’t like being told that they’re insignificant . . . .” (quoting 
Telephone Interview 30020 (Feb. 3, 2009))). 
 303. Id. at 93 (“In my opinion, just my opinion, we’re real people here and we’re not worth 
dirt.” (quoting Telephone Interview 30039 (Nov. 3, 2009))). 
 304. Id. at 91. 
 305. See id. at 107 (quoting Interview 30011 (Oct. 24, 2008)). 
 306. Id. at 93. 
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international tribunals convened in response to episodes of genocide.307 
As Professor Martha Minow has argued, such tribunals may turn 
consuming grief and rage toward the more concrete and socially 
attainable goal of securing justice in relation to specific perpetrators.308  
Most relevant to the social aspects of life under forced separation, 
many of the named plaintiffs emphasized that what motivated them to 
invest their time and energy in the collective process, and what made 
them eventually feel empowered by it, was not only and not even mainly 
self-interest.309 Because success is far from being guaranteed, and even a 
win of a class action frequently means only a modest tangible reward, 
participants emphasized first being driven and later feeling rewarded by 
something else.310 They described their motivation and satisfaction as 
related to being engaged in “protecting the public”311 or representing “the 
people who had been harmed.”312 Some even expressed particular care 
for class members “who were [more] vulnerable.”313 Confirming the 
authenticity of these reported sentiments and explaining their importance, 
class action lawyers stated that the best class representatives are those 
who “care for something beyond their self-interest.”314 Given such 
emphasis on the unselfish drive to collaborate, it is worth noting that 
many studies have shown that engaging in other-regarding behaviors and 
experiencing other-oriented positive emotions are associated with greater 
wellbeing.315 Thus, understanding class actions as expressions of 
prosocial motivations explains much of the general sense of 
empowerment reported by partakers. 
Furthermore, contributors to class actions have also associated their 
activity with a sense of moral adequacy. Blending the value of prosocial 
behavior and morality, they described, for instance, a feeling that they 
“were doing the right thing for hopefully a lot of people.”316 Contributors 
also framed their class action as a battle of right and wrong, attributing 
their satisfaction to the fact that “‘right’ won out.”317 Needless to say that 
 
 307. Abrams & Keren, supra note 293, at 2054 (defining a variety of ways in which law 
influences emotions and describing in this context how “[t]he law can also work to channel or 
moderate emotions that are already being experienced by a particular person or group”). 
 308. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY 
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 52–90 (1998); Abrams & Keren, supra note 293. 
 309. See Meili, supra note 297, at 88–89. 
 310. Id. at 89–96. 
 311. Id. at 87. 
 312. Id. at 94 (quoting Telephone Interview 1018 (Dec. 12, 2008)). 
 313. Id. at 89. 
 314. Id. at 103 (quoting Telephone Interview 1012 (Nov. 17, 2008)). 
 315. See, e.g., Stephen G. Post, Altruism, Happiness, and Health: It’s Good to Be Good, 12 
INT’L J. BEHAV. MED. 66, 66 (2005). 
 316. Meili, supra note 297, at 95 (quoting Telephone Interview 30032 (July 28, 2009)). 
 317. Id. at 117. 
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participants’ view of class actions as morally valuable stands in sharp 
contrast to their demonized portrayal in the cases constituting the 
arbitration revolution. Even more importantly, the reported satisfaction 
from doing the right thing reveals that participants in class actions not 
only care for other claimants who were similarly harmed but also care 
about maintaining just social order. 
For all those reasons combined, people who took part in class actions 
often stressed that for them, participation meant far more than using a 
procedural tool. They have defined class actions as “consumers’ only 
recourse”318 and as “the only way” to cope with corporate wrongdoing.319 
Indeed, even though emotions were not the focus of Meili’s study, he 
found it necessary to emphasize “how many named plaintiffs see the class 
action as their last best hope of holding corporations accountable.”320 
Accordingly, these reported sentiments suggest that involvement in class 
actions was the only thing that saved participants from feeling 
helplessness and even despair. 
All in all, when they are read with special attention to emotions, the 
statements of Meili’s interviewees offer a rare glimpse into the emotional 
world of those involved in class actions. Recognizing the positive 
emotions coming from such involvement also sheds light on what it 
would feel like to live in a world without any collective legal recourse. 
Instead of feeling caring, moral, empowered, and proud, people may 
remain trapped in their initial anger while feeling disempowered by their 
inability to do anything about it. In other words, Meili’s interviewees 
reveal emotions that corroborate the feelings of the employee cited 
earlier, who—due to being subject to a class action waiver—reported 
feeling powerlessness and isolation.321 Most importantly, Meili’s 
interviews also help to reconceptualize class action activity as an act of 
care and as a form of social activism that aligns with morality and justice. 
Such new understanding provides a way to resist the hostile neoliberal 
message—often amplified by the Justices responsible for the arbitration 
revolution—according to which collective actions are driven by selfish 
greed and a desire to a desire to achieve “‘in terrorem’ settlements” of 
“questionable claims.”322 
Finally, focusing on the emotions that drive collective actions and are 
produced by them helps in understanding how natural and robust the 
drive to band together is, especially when personal resilience is so 
evidently insufficient. A new study by Professors Andrea Chandrasekher 
 
 318. Id. (quoting Telephone Interview 1018 (Dec. 12, 2008)). 
 319. Id. at 118 (quoting Telephone Interview 30034 (Sept. 25, 2009)). 
 320. Id. at 117 (emphasis added). 
 321. Cf. Seipel, supra note 294, at 2 (noting how one software engineer felt powerless and 
isolated as a result of the employment class action waiver). 
 322. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011). 
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and David Horton further validates this point.323 It reveals that as the 
arbitration revolution has progressed and has blocked access to class 
arbitrations, claimants yearning for justice have found a new way to band 
together, which the authors call “class action-style cases.”324 According 
to the study, in this way hundreds of seemingly individual actions that 
share identical facts and claims are brought against the same wrongdoer 
and are all managed by the same lawyers.325 For example, the study 
reports that in one case, the same law firm filed on the same day “1,354 
employment cases against Macy’s in the AAA.”326 Although the authors 
criticize this new development, their empirical findings tell a story that 
matches the testimonies of Meili’s interviewees: that people feel a need 
to band together and will make much effort to act in concert against 
injustice. 
2.  Consumers’ Complaints Websites 
Both the existence and the content of consumer-created complaint 
websites can illustrate how corporate wrongdoing generates a painful 
sense of powerlessness that is followed by a rise of need to alleviate the 
pain by creating solidarities with others who have similarly suffered. The 
websites offer a dense description of the helplessness that comes from 
having to face big corporations all alone. First and foremost, such 
websites demonstrate a constant quest for coping with wrongdoing 
collectively: by communicating with others, exchanging information and 
ideas for solutions, and considering and planning engagement in a variety 
of collective actions. And, with particular relevance to the current 
discussion, a salient place within this effort to band together is saved in 
these websites to hopes and attempts to use legal measures and bring 
about collective actions.327 
Marketing scholars James Ward and Amy Ostrom conducted a study 
of forty consumer-constructed websites. The study reported that what 
motivates consumers to create complaint websites or engage in their 
operation are feelings of isolation and powerlessness as a result of 
corporate wrongdoing.328 For example, the study cited one aggrieved 
consumer who wrote: “If things go seriously wrong you will be totally on 
 
 323. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 26–50. 
 324. Id. at 55 (using and describing the term). 
 325. Id. at 54. 
 326. Id. at 55. 
 327. For many comments against SLS on Complaints Board, see SLS – Class Action Suit, 
COMPLAINTSBOARD, https://www.complaintsboard.com/complaints/sls-c313430.html#comments 
[https://perma.cc/VEU7-8EV8], which includes an example of one consumer writing: “How can 
we all be a part of this CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT? pLEASE enlighten us.” 
 328. See James C. Ward & Amy L. Ostrom, Complaining to the Masses: The Role of Protest 
Framing in Customer-Created Complaint Web Sites, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 220, 220 (2006). 
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your own.”329 More generally, Ward and Ostrom noted that “[c]onsumer 
dissatisfaction has long been regarded as primarily a lonely 
experience.”330 Importantly, the loneliness that the coauthors described 
in their study echoes the feeling of isolation expressed by the employee 
cited earlier, who found himself limited by a class action waiver.331 
Another interviewee in Ward and Ostrom’s study stated: “us ‘little 
people’ seem to have no recourse!!!”332 Note that this last statement is 
remarkably identical to the sentiments of Meili’s interviewees, who also 
reported resorting to collective action to cope with being made to 
experience themselves as “little people” and who also felt that they had 
no other recourse.333 This matching choice of words suggests how 
characteristic is the link between powerlessness and isolation and how 
common it is for people interacting with big corporations to feel 
disempowered and as a result to feel a pressing emotionally driven need 
to come together. It also explains why when coming together is 
forbidden, like in the case of the employee cited earlier, the result is 
experiencing similar emotions and referring to them explicitly as 
isolation and powerlessness. 
Intriguingly, founders of and participants in consumers’ complaints 
websites frequently express a strong belief that, pursuant to corporate 
aggression, collective action is the exclusive coping mechanism and the 
only way to fight the paralyzing effect of powerlessness.334 On this point, 
Ward and Ostrom’s study quoted, for example, a disgruntled customer of 
Allstate who stated: “If we don’t help each other out, we’re all potential 
victims, but there is strength in numbers.”335 Similarly, another frustrated 
customer, this time of United Airlines, reportedly asserted: “We must all 
work together if we have any chance of making a difference. Let’s get 
together and make a stand United!”336 To tie these quotes to the previous 
Part, note how they directly clash with Buchanan and Koch’s fear of the 
power of numbers and people’s ability to get together.337 More generally, 
Ward and Ostrom found that 85% of the site creators encouraged others 
to join their efforts by adopting a website design that includes the ability 
 
 329. Id. at 224. 
 330. Id. at 228. 
 331. Seipel, supra note 294, at 2. 
 332. Ward & Ostrom, supra note 328, at 226. 
 333. See Meili, supra note 297, at 90. 
 334. See Ward & Ostrom, supra note 328, at 221 (“[I]ndividuals may feel impotent to affect 
the large institutions that are often targets of protest.”). 
 335. Id. at 226 (emphasis added). 
 336. Id. (emphasis added). 
 337. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
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to add and share comments and stories.338 Significantly, 45% of them also 
expressly called for acting collectively.339  
Most importantly to the discussion of the arbitration revolution, 
consumers’ complaint websites reveal that when consumers imagine 
joining forces against the business that harmed them, they often envision 
using the law and specifically initiating class actions.  In one leading site, 
tellingly titled the Complaint Board,340 many borrowers have contested 
and protested long years of exploitation by a specific lender: Specialized 
Loan Services (SLS). For example, expressing both the powerlessness of 
confronting SLS all by herself and her desperate desire to unite with 
others specifically through a class action, one borrower stated: “I am a 
single mother with 3 children. Please let us all get together and make this 
into a large if not the largest class action suit ever.”341 Likewise, Ward 
and Ostrom’s study described a consumer who was in “tears,” having 
realized she is not alone in her battle and asked: “Can we bring a joint 
suit against this fraudulent company?”342 Another consumer cited in this 
study, named Karla, expressed a similar wish, asking: “Can we get 
together? Go to the media, or a class action suit???”343 Meaningfully, 
such explicit yearning for class actions coming from consumers’ websites 
mirrors and reinforces the positive emotions that the participants of class 
actions in Meili’s interviews expressed. 
All these voices together—the employee who directly expressed 
feelings of powerlessness due to inability to initiate class actions, Meili’s 
interviewees who took part in class actions, and the consumers who so 
explicitly make online wishes for class actions—present a clear quest for 
coming together in response to being harmed. They reflect a reality in 
which when individuals feel powerless to cope with wrongs all by 
themselves, they tend to handle the situation by searching for an escape 
from this paralyzing sense and naturally seek to establish coalitions with 
similar others. Then, as an essential part of this prosocial coping 
mechanism, people tend to turn to the law, imagining a class action as 
one of the most effective ways out of their powerlessness.344 All of that 
 
 338. See Ward & Ostrom, supra note 328, at 226. 
 339. Id. 
 340. See SLS – Class Action Suit, supra note 327; see also Alex, Best Complaint Websites 
2018, MEDIUM (Mar. 7, 2018), https://medium.com/@complaintlinealex/best-complaint-
websites-2018-3f1f23b61cdf [https://perma.cc/4BWJ-7MBZ] (listing and reviewing leading 
complaint websites). 
 341. MR.Hasla, Comment to SLS – Class Action Suit, COMPLAINTSBOARD (Dec. 15, 2012) 
(emphasis added), https://www.complaintsboard.com/complaints/sls-c313430.html#comments 
[https://perma.cc/VEU7-8EV8].  
 342. Ward & Ostrom, supra note 328, at 227 (emphasis added).  
 343. Id. (emphasis added). 
 344. See Meili, supra note 297, at 131 (“[T]he role of named plaintiff itself provides a sense 
of importance and empowerment . . . .”). 
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speaks volumes as to the magnitude of the emotional cost of taking away 
from those who already feel powerless their primary method of coping: 
the collective action option. As we shall now see, the study of emotions 
offers additional support to this observation. 
3.  The Affective Dimensions of Isolation and Powerlessness  
While isolation and powerlessness can be treated as cognitive 
descriptions of factual conditions, it is crucial to acknowledge their 
emotional, sometimes called “affective,” side.345 Scholars interested in 
emotions in a variety of disciplines have linked alienation and 
powerlessness, describing them as “intra-psychic mental states.”346 They 
have also stressed the need to understand powerlessness “in terms of 
subjective sentiments.”347 Without diving into nuanced distinctions, 
common among theorists of emotions, between emotions, affects, 
feelings, and other parallel terms, what is significant for the current 
discussion is to notice that a meaningful part of what the interviewees in 
all the settings described above had voiced relates to the affective (or 
emotional) dimensions of their experiences. “Hearing” their voices as 
expressing emotional states is central to improving our understating of 
the consequences of the arbitration revolution. 
Once the affective side of powerlessness is better recognized, it is vital 
to illuminate some of its leading emotional components further to grasp 
why feeling powerless can be painful and create the need to overcome the 
pain by seeking collective action. In his extensive exploration of affective 
powerlessness (which he calls subjective powerlessness), sociologist 
Warren TenHouten explains powerlessness as an emotional state that 
includes several basic emotions that are each unpleasant on its own.348 
For example, his account presents sadness as part of powerlessness and 
explains that feeling subjected to external dominance, at the expense of 
being able to control one’s reality personally, tends “to increase sadness 
and clinical-level depression.”349 
Additionally, TenHouten explains that fear is also involved in feeling 
powerless, emerging as a response to the realization that actions of a 
powerful agent are, or may become, damaging to the wellbeing of the 
powerless agent.350 Social hierarchy—such as the one existing between 
 
 345. See Warren D. TenHouten, The Emotions of Powerlessness, 9 J. POL. POWER 83, 111 
(2016) (“[P]owerlessness is a sentiment that has both cognitive and affective aspects.”).  
 346. Id. at 84.  
 347. Melvin Seeman, Sentiments and Structures: Strategies for Research in Alienation, in 
96 ALIENATION, COMMUNITY, AND WORK 17, 21 (Andrew Oldenquist & Menachem Rosner eds., 
1991).  
 348. See TenHouten, supra note 345, at 86.  
 349. Id. at 86–87. 
 350. Id. at 87.  
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corporations and their consumers and employees—can generate such fear 
as soon as the possibility of wrongdoing by the dominant party arises.351 
Pertinent to legal disputes, even the prospect of having to confront the 
stronger party, especially alone, may induce fear relating to the risks of 
both defeat and retaliation.352 For example, in his influential study of 
social power, political sociologist John Gaventa described how powerless 
coal miners at the Appalachian Valley were afraid to complain and 
protest against their working conditions out of fear for their lives, jobs, 
and homes.353  
What is worse, the fear in powerlessness is often associated with 
anxiety due to the lack of perceived ability to cope with the threat.354 Such 
anxiety may have additional debilitating consequences.355 Finally, 
powerlessness sometimes brings shame about, and even humiliation, both 
due to the inability, perceived or actual, to fend off the pressures of those 
with power advantage.356 As one scholar observed: “There is no more 
humiliating experience than to have one’s relative lack of power in 
relation to another continuously rubbed in one’s face,”357 concluding that 
“[p]owerlessness activates shame.”358 
Appreciating how unpleasant is the affective experience of 
powerlessness, especially given the other negative emotions it entails, it 
is easier to comprehend how it induces a natural, perhaps even inevitable, 
response directed at alleviating the pain.359 And, since the pain is coming 
from a sense of diminished control, the spontaneous reaction is an attempt 
to restore some power.360 Indeed, a leading theory in social psychology, 
“the theory of psychological reactance,” holds in general that “a threat to 
or a loss of a freedom motivates the individual to restore that freedom.”361 
 
 351. See id. (“Out of prudence, fear, and the desire to curry favor, public performances of 
the powerless are often shaped to appeal to the expectations of the powerful, while accepting the 
social order’s status quo as natural and inevitable.” (citation omitted)). 
 352. See id. (“The prospect of challenging dominant elites can result in fear of defeat and 
subsequent reprisals.”). 
 353. JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS 205–06 (1980). 
 354. See TenHouten, supra note 345, at 92.  
 355. Id. 
 356. See id. 
 357. GERSHEN KAUFMAN, SHAME: THE POWER OF CARING 23 (3d ed. 1992). 
 358. Id. at 197. 
 359. See TenHouten, supra note 345, at 94–95 (discussing responses elicited from fear or 
embarrassment and the subsequent attempts to minimize those responses). 
 360. See id. at 87; Derek D. Rucker & Adam D. Galinsky, Desire to Acquire: Powerlessness 
and Compensatory Consumption, 35 J. CONSUMER RES., 257, 258–59 (2008).  
 361. SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF 
FREEDOM AND CONTROL 4 (2013); see also Benjamin D. Rosenberg & Jason T. Siegel, A 50-Year 
Review of Psychological Reactance Theory: Do Not Read this Article, MOTIVATION SCI., Dec. 21, 
2017, at 1 (discussing Brehm’s theory holding that when a person’s freedom of behavior is 
threatened, she is “motivated to restore it”).  
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In the context of consumption, for example, researchers have argued 
based on experiments that “feeling powerless is often an aversive state 
that will lead consumers to attempt to attenuate or alter this state.”362 
Accordingly, efforts to band together with others to counter wrongdoing 
by a stronger entity should be understood as an effort to escape feelings 
of powerlessness and restoring some control via collective actions. 
However, when restoring control is impossible, as it is in the world 
recently created by the arbitration revolution, an opposite psychological 
response is likely to emerge. Being trapped in continuous powerlessness 
and imposed isolation, people may internalize the external legal rule and 
develop learned helplessness.363 According to this influential 
psychological theory, when people are exposed to a prolonged (or 
permanent) inability to control external events or conditions by taking 
action, they become “prone to learn a passive or ‘helpless’ action 
orientation.”364 The broader implications of the possibility that the 
arbitration revolution is cultivating learned helplessness will be further 
discussed in the remaining sections. For now, however, it is valuable to 
recognize that at the most individual level, learned helplessness is known 
to be associated with many physical and mental health problems such as 
chronic stress and depression.365 This is not to suggest that every 
uncompensated small-dollars claim can lead, by itself, to these severe 
outcomes, but to call attention to the aggregate risk society takes when it 
exposes millions of people to arbitration clauses and thus to a systemic 
lack of redress. 
4.  Intentionally Produced Resignation 
The affective outcomes of depriving people of their legal ability to 
take part in acts of solidarity are hardly unintended consequences. The 
neoliberal project, in general, and large corporations, in particular, are 
highly interested in maintaining their dominance.366 In the service of this 
interest, they engage not only in influencing rules such as the FAA. They 
also deliberately and strategically target emotions, imposing isolation in 
an effort to deplete people’s emotional resources and, in that way, 
 
 362. Rucker & Galinsky, supra note 360, at 257. 
 363. For one of the most influential works in psychology and in general and the definitive 
book on the subject of learned helplessness in particular, see MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, 
HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH (1975). 
 364. Jarkko Pyysiäinen et al., Neoliberal Governance and ‘Responsibilization’ of Agents: 
Reassessing the Mechanisms of Responsibility-Shift in Neoliberal Discursive Environments, 18 
DISTINKTION 215, 222 (2017). 
 365. See, e.g., ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, WHY ZEBRAS DON’T GET ULCERS: THE ACCLAIMED 
GUIDE TO STRESS, STRESS-RELATED DISEASES, AND COPING 494–95 (3d ed. 2004) (offering a 
review of learned helplessness literature in the context of stress and depression). 
 366. See WILSON, supra note 173, at 22. 
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undermine their resilience.367 The resulting feelings of powerlessness 
help neoliberals and corporations to maintain the status quo because they 
operate to repress resistance and secure a docile state of mind.368  
In their article Capitalism and the Politics of Resignation, 
anthropologists Peter Benson and Stuart Kirsch argue that “corporations 
actively cultivate” and benefit from a “general feeling of 
disempowerment.”369 Naming this feeling “resignation,” the authors 
explain it, along the lines of affective powerlessness, as a feeling structure 
that reflects a recognition that “things [have] gone awry[,] but  one is 
practically unable to do anything about it.”370 They further argue that 
resignation arises from an “acknowledgment that structural limitations 
impede one’s ability to bring about change.”371 In many cases of felt 
resignation, they assert, all that is left is to use the popular response of 
“whatever,” which conveys the general surrendering to corporations’ 
unlimited power.372 
To illustrate their argument that corporations deliberately “seek to 
produce resignation and stifle critique,”373 Benson and Kirsch analyze 
strategies that tobacco companies use against consumers’ class actions 
and legislative intentions to prohibit smoking.374 They also describe 
similar practices used to achieve what they call “the hijacking of 
critique”375 in the mining industry.376 Further supporting Benson and 
Kirsch’s descriptions of how the politics of resignation works, others 
have more recently revealed a similar pattern of intentional cultivation of 
powerlessness and resignation in additional corporate settings, such as in 
 
 367. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Legal Hopes: Enhancing Resilience Through the 
External Cultivation of Positive Emotions, 64 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 111, 113–14 (2013). 
 368. See Rucker & Galinsky, supra note 360, at 259. Interestingly, corporations benefit from 
powerlessness in a way that is even more straightforward than those discussed in this section. The 
literature regarding consumers’ behavior establishes that when consumers feel powerless they 
tend to spend more money on the purchase of goods and services, especially those associated with 
higher status (and more power) or those expected to increase their sense of belonging. See id.; 
Lukasz Walasek et al., The Need to Belong and the Value of Belongings: Does Ostracism Change 
the Subjective Value of Personal Possessions?, 58 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 195, 203–
04 (2015) (finding that feelings of ostracism do not impact people’s feelings towards their 
belongings except consumers will purchase “an unappealing product only when its public 
consumption would increase the opportunity for social affiliation”). These findings align with the 
theory of psychological reactance discussed earlier. See Rucker & Galinsky, supra note 360, at 
259.  
 369. Peter Benson & Stuart Kirsch, Capitalism and the Politics of Resignation, 51 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 459, 460 (2010).  
 370. Id. at 468. 
 371. Id.  
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. See id. at 468–71. 
 375. Id. at 475. 
 376. See id. at 471–74. 
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the rapidly growing industry of data-gathering.377 Together, such works 
generally demonstrate that corporations have routinized ways to make 
people feel that resistance would be futile with the intention of fostering 
resignation. 
But why would neoliberals and corporations target the emotions? In 
general, because it is an effective way to have people internalize a 
message that would have been resisted if ordered from above. Indeed, in 
many non-legal disciplines, the so-called “affective turn” has increased 
awareness of the role emotions play in guiding human behavior. Such a 
body of work teaches that one salient way in which emotions are 
understood to direct behavior is their capacity to create action 
tendencies.378 Anger, for example, induces an inclination to attack379 and 
is considered an emotion that motivates collective action.380 To a large 
degree, then, corporations and those who are interested in maintaining 
their control must counter such anger at the emotional level. Importantly, 
feelings of powerlessness, especially when combined with fear, sadness, 
and/or shame, all generate precisely the behaviors that serve best the goal 
of securing hegemony: inhibiting defiance and fostering acceptance of 
the status quo. 
First, with regard to the inhibition of defiance, the cultivation of 
affective powerlessness creates action tendencies of avoidance and 
inaction381 as well as “passivity and resignation.”382 In the same vein, 
studies of affective powerlessness suggest that it is associated with 
 
 377. See, e.g., Nora A. Draper & John Turow, The Corporate Cultivation of Digital 
Resignation, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1824, 1829 (2019); see also Lina Dencik & Jonathan Cable, 
The Advent of Surveillance Realism: Public Opinion and Activist Responses to the Snowden 
Leaks, 11 INT’L J. COMM. 763, 777 & n.3 (2017) (discussing how unease over surveillance does 
not result in active resistance against such practices). 
 378. See, e.g., Barbara L. Fredrickson, The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology: 
The Broaden-and-Build Theory of Positive Emotions, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 218, 219 (2001) 
(“Discrete emotion theorists often link the function of specific emotions to the concept of specific 
action tendencies. Fear, for example, is linked with the urge to escape, anger with the urge to 
attack, disgust with the urge to expel, and so on.” (citations omitted)). 
 379. See id. 
 380. Martijn van Zomeren et al., Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective 
Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives, 134 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 504, 506 (2008).  
 381. See generally RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION & ADAPTATION (1991) (explaining what 
action tendencies are and describing avoidance and inaction tendencies as arising from emotions 
such as sadness and shame, which are part of affective powerfulness). An example of such 
inaction can be seen in the context of climate change. See  Christopher Aitken et al., Climate 
Change, Powerlessness and the Commons Dilemma: Assessing New Zealanders’ Preparedness 
to Act, 21 GLOBAL ENVT’L CHANGE 752, 758 (2011) (suggesting, in the context of climate change, 
that individuals who feel more “powerless” are less likely to take action). 
 382. AARON BEN-ZE’EV, THE SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS 466 (2000) (discussing sadness, which 
is part of affective powerless, as creating passivity and resignation); see also LAZARUS, supra note 
381, at 247 (discussing sadness as inducing resignation). 
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conforming to authority and submissiveness.383 Over time, all the 
tendencies that feeling powerless produce may even turn into the 
condition of learned helplessness that was discussed earlier. When this 
occurs, the inhibition of defiance becomes more permanent, in line with 
the interests of neoliberals and corporations. 
Second, with regard to the acceptance of the status quo, it should be 
noted that while fostering affective powerlessness produces formal 
consent, it is a distorted type of approval.384 Far from expressing an 
agreement agreeing to desired results, this consent is based on reluctant 
acceptance and has more to do with surrendering to a given reality due to 
lack of choice or alternatives.385 Some scholars have called this type of 
unwilling consent “acquiescence,”386 and others named it “disaffected 
consent.”387 This is also precisely the sort of consent that consumers and 
workers are giving—at the beginning of the process—to class action 
waivers. Hence, in her dissent in Epic, Justice Ginsburg aptly named them 
“arm-twisted waivers.”388 The arbitration revolution thus can and should 
be seen as operating at the emotional level to finish off what corporations 
have started: cultivating affective powerlessness that not only suppresses 
resistance but is also capable of producing “disaffected consent” to the 
entire process. 
To conclude, an emotional state of powerlessness is not only a severe 
consequence of the arbitration revolution but also an intentional outcome 
that has been strategically produced to serve the interests of neoliberals 
and corporations. Inciting people to feel powerless benefits the hyper-
capitalist system that neoliberalism promotes and enriches corporations 
because, as argued here, it can produce resignation or even learned 
helplessness. As a result of such manipulation of the emotions, the urge 
to band together and act collectively—so loudly articulated in the 
interviews cited earlier—has been dying from within.  
CONCLUSION 
At the core of this Article are neoliberal processes difficult to notice, 
trace, and narrate. And yet, the task is vital. The neoliberalization of 
 
 383. See TenHouten, supra note 345, at 93 (noting an association with submissiveness); id. 
at 96 (noting an association with conforming to authority). 
 384. See id. at 93. 
 385. For different types of consent in general, including “unwanted consent,” see Robin 
West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 221, 246–47 
(Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). For different types of consent in the 
contractual setting, see Hila Keren, Consenting Under Stress, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 721–23 
(2013). 
 386. TenHouten, supra note 345, at 88. 
 387. Jeremy Gilbert, Disaffected Consent: That Post-Democratic Feeling, SOUNDINGS, 
Summer 2015, at 29. 
 388. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1642 n.9 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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everything, including our laws, extracts a toll too high to overlook. Such 
toll demands that we delve into the intricacies of nonlegal disciplines and 
wrestle with their integration so that we can fully account for what is at 
stake. 
By adding to previous discussions an analysis of the latest episode of 
the arbitration revolution, the Supreme Court decision in Lamps Plus, this 
Article has made it more evident that the legal system has been going 
through a “tectonic shift.”389 It has exposed that as a result of this 
decision, corporations do not even need to insist on collective action 
waivers anymore. Post-Lamps Plus, corporations need only include 
simple arbitration clauses in their standard contracts—the courts will do 
the rest. That is, corporations now have the ability to separate millions of 
future claimants even without drafting waivers of collective action into 
their contracts. The upshot of forging such an easy path to liability 
evasion has never been more palpable: without the ability to band 
together, most claims are doomed to disappear. This is precisely the 
reason corporations sought to include “arbitration” clauses in standard 
contracts to begin with:  to sound the death knell for most claims against 
them. 
In her recent book, The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth 
and Inequality, Professor Katharina Pistor identifies the wealth-
enhancing impact of the law.390 She describes how lawyers who “seek to 
ensure that their clients can accomplish their goals legally,” use their 
planning and drafting skills to shape transactions that “push the 
boundaries of existing law,” and then await the response of judges and 
regulators.391 Pistor explains that such legal strategies do not always 
succeed (recall the invalidation of class action waivers in the “Discover 
Bank Rule”392), but insists that through “constantly contesting the 
existing boundaries of legal rules . . . lawyers turn any of their clients’ 
assets into capital.”393 As retold here, the story of using arbitration clauses 
as devices that buy corporations’ immunity by the strategy of divide and 
conquer provides a powerful example. It details how lawyers and the law 
have meaningfully contributed to the creation of new capital for 
corporations, allowing them to extract value from their contractual 
counterparts while minimizing their exposure to liability.  
Moreover, this Article has shown that the arbitration revolution is not 
merely, and perhaps not even primarily, a legal shift. Instead, the 
 
 389. Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 4. 
 390. See generally KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES 
WEALTH AND INEQUALITY (2019) (explaining the idea that law creates wealth and inequality 
through capital). 
 391. Id. at 213 (emphasis in the original). 
 392. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 393. PISTOR, supra note 390, at 213. 
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revolution and its sweeping consequences can be fully understood only 
once put in their broader context. Taking into account parallel changes in 
ideology, politics, and culture, this Article has illuminated the arbitration 
revolution as an essential part of a more extensive neoliberal program. It 
has demonstrated that as both a product of neoliberal logic and a tool for 
further establishment of neoliberal hegemony, the resulting new 
arbitration jurisprudence should be reconceptualized as a building block 
in the intentional construction of a corporatized political economy. As 
such, the revolution belongs with a growing list of legal shifts similarly 
operating to allow corporations not only to immunize themselves from 
legal liability through contracts, but also to dominate campaign 
finance,394 have First Amendment rights,395 break unions,396 and so much 
more. 
Foreclosing all paths to solidarity does much more than extinguish 
any realistic way to cope with corporate power. With immeasurable 
authority and immense influence on public opinion, the Supreme Court 
has engaged in normalizing, legitimizing, and encouraging the ability of 
corporations to become invincible. As a result, and precisely as Margaret 
Thatcher wanted it to be, the process has been changing our souls,397 
extending the harsh practical effects of the revolution “into the depths of 
our subjectivities.”398 As this Article has explained for the first time, the 
prolonged factual state of “divided and conquered” induces affective 
powerlessness: a dangerous cluster of emotions that leaves people 
resigned and unable to resist. Even worse, such affective powerlessness 
is not an unintended consequence, but rather part and parcel of “the 
‘politics of resignation’”399—a calculated effort by neoliberals and the 
corporations they promote to protect their dominance. The principal risk, 
thus, does not arise merely from the fact that corporations found a way—
that the Supreme Court approved—to avoid liability. The threat goes far 
beyond that to the production of collective numbness and the possible 
creation of learned helplessness in our society. Alarmingly, it does not 
stop there. 
In her recently published book, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, political 
scientist Wendy Brown cautions against the fatal harm to democracy that 
the neoliberal takeover of our lives continues to cause. She argues that 
while at the beginning the neoliberal project focused on replacing 
political control with market control, it more recently (and in a timeline 
 
 394. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
 395. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 690–91 (2014). 
 396. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). 
 397. Interview by Ronald Butt with Margaret Thatcher, supra note 180. 
 398. WILSON, supra note 173, at 46. 
 399. Benson & Kirsch, supra note 369, at 460. 
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that parallels the arbitration revolution) has gone even further.400 
According to Brown, “the neoliberal utopia” of a social order “in which 
individuals and families would be politically pacified by markets and 
morals”401 has developed into a program of “starving . . . democratic 
energies.”402 Her chilling analysis describes relentless neoliberal efforts 
“to dedemocratize the political culture and the subjects within it.”403  
The arbitration revolution, as reconceptualized in this Article, 
forcefully demonstrates the magnitude of the risk Brown identifies. We 
cannot assume that the effects of the revolution’s widespread cultivation 
of affective powerlessness will remain contained in the realm of standard 
contracts. Instead, it is predictable that people who feel resigned because 
there is nothing left for them to do when their service providers and 
employers wrong them are unlikely to feel motivated to engage in any 
other form of democratic citizenship. This specter should motivate 
anyone who cares about democracy to not abandon the efforts to change 
the current situation. This Article has offered an original understanding 
of how the arbitration revolution threatens democracy. Such 
understanding should reignite efforts to reverse the revolution and give 
people back their freedom to act collectively. Hopefully, a resumed 
ability to band together would restore access to justice and, with it, would 
generate a broader drive to become more involved in our democratic 
society. 
 
 400. See BROWN, supra note 157, at 58. 
 401. Id. at 17. 
 402. Id. at 57. 
 403. Id. at 58. 
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